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ABSTRACT 
Since the exchange of encrypted data in interpersonal electronic messages is both rare and 
easily detected, steganographic techniques are needed to ensure that private 
communications do not raise suspicion. Previous work in this area is largely inapplicable 
to environments such as the Internet, as these schemes require the exchange of large data 
sets in the form of image or sound files, or the sharing of large databases used for the 
steganographic encoding and decoding, A class of novel systems is presented here which 
aims to provide a practical solution for steganography over text-based channels with 
minimal shared information required. The implementation of one of the four presented 
systems is described and initial experimental results are reported. 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author would like to profusely thank Dr. Ricardo Uribe for his consistent support and 
interest throughout the duration of this project. This work has also benefited greatly from 
the ideas and suggestions of Rick Haselton and Robert McGrath. Finally, it is likely that 
the project would not have reached this point without the enthusiasm and interest shared 
by friends, especially William Gillespie and Joseph Futrelle. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1
1.1 Motivation ..................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Steganography ............................................................................... 2 
1.3 Previous Work.............................................................................. 7 
1.4 Contribution of Bonzo-coding ........................................................ 16 
1.5 Organization of This Document ...................................................... 17 
2. BONZO-CODING SYSTEMS ............................................................ 18 
2.1 Bonzo-Coding Fundamentals ........................................................ 18 
2.2 System 1: Simple Word-hashing .................................... ................ 21 
2.3 System 2: Word Padding and Hash Scrambling ............................. 24 
2.4 System 3: Mimic Function Processing of Ciphertext ....................... 29 
2.5 System 4: Compression of Hash Function Output .......................... 31 
3. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................... 34 
3.1 System Overview .......................................................................... 34 
3.2 PGP Encryption, Decryption ......................................................... 36 
3.3 Bonzotext Structure ...................................................................... 37 
3.4 Debonzifier Operation ................................................................... 39 
3.5 Language File Specification ........................................................... 40 
3.6 Bonzifier Operation ....................................................................... 41 
4. RESULTS ............................................................................................ 43 
4.1 Bonzotext Suitability ..................................................................... 43 
4.2 Typical Expansion Ratios .............................................................. 44 
4.3 Time Efficiency ............................................................................. 45 
4.4 Statistical Characteristics .............................................................. 46 
5. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................... 52 
5.1 Conclusions .................................................................................. 52 
5.2 Future Work................................................................................ 52 
APPENDIX A. PROGRAM LISTINGS .............................................. 54 
A.I ENSMOOCH.C .............................................................. 54 
A.2 DESMOOCH.C .............................................................. 56 
A.3 DEBONZO.C .................................................................. 58 
A.4 BONZIFY.BAS ............................................................... 63 
APPENDIX B. SAMPLE LANGUAGE FILE..................................... 84 
v 
APPENDIX C. SAMPLE OUTPUT.................................................... 86 
C. J SAMPLE BONZOTEXT I: COMPLAINT LETTER ...... 86 
C.2 SAMPLEBONZOTEXT 2: MODERN POETRY........... 87 
C.3 SAMPLE BONZOTEXT 3: RECIPES............................. 88 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 89 
vi 
Figure 
I. I.
1.2.
1.3.
J.4.
J.5.
1.6.
1.7.
1.8.
1.9.
I.IO.
2.1. 
2.2. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 
2.6. 
3.J.
3.2.
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.3. 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Communication model of modem steganography .... ............................ .... 3 
An acrostic by Lewis Carroll ................................................................... 8 
A subliminal sentence news poem by William Gillespie ......................... ... 9 
Variation on subliminal sentence sent during WWII ......... ........................ 9 
Example template used for smooch-coding .............................................. 11 
Output of encoder with hidden message "Please return my albums." ........ 12 
Sample template sentence structures for Texto ........................................ 13 
Sample output of Texto .......................................................................... 13 
Example Context-Free Grammar production rules ................................... 15 
Huffman tree for the example CFG mimic function .................................. 15 
Block diagram of System 1 ..................................................................... 21 
Block diagram of System 2 ..................................................................... 25 
Pseudo-code for debonzification algorithm of System 2 ........................... 27 
Pseudo-code for bonzification algorithm of System 2 .............................. 27 
Block diagram of System 3 ..................................................................... 29 
Block diagram of System 4 ..................................................................... 32 
BJock diagram of implemented system ..................................................... 35 
Sample bonzotext with �=7. p=2 ............................................................ 38 
Entropy test ............................................................................................ 4 7 
Chi-squared statistic for byte value .......................................................... 49 
Chi-squared statistic for bit value ............................................................ 50
vii 
CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Today most communication occurs over insecure chann_els. The information exchanged by phone, 
postal mail, electronic mail or similar means may be subject to any number of forms of 
eavesdropping or monitoring. This observation is based less on paranoia than on plain common 
sense. 1
The threats and risks involved in communicating in the paper world or via the telephone network 
are fairly well-understood, and they are limited in large part by the physical effort required by an 
eavesdropper wishing to monitor particular excha!lges. However, in the realm of electronic 
communications across "open" networks such as the Internet, the threats are far greater. It is 
surprisingly easy to monitor or even intercept digital message exchanges on a public, packet­
switched network since the communication paths employed are neither controlled nor secure. 
And considering that eavesdroppers not only have access to these communication links, but they 
may also have substantial computing resources, the threat to personal privacy posed by automated 
monitoring tools becomes a serious issue. 
The rich field of cryptography is concerned with how infonnation can be scrambled in such a way 
that only the intended recipient(s) can descramble and make use of it. Fortunately, the decades of 
intense study devoted to this problem have led to a number of solutions which are thought to be 
adequate. There are a number of seemingly unbreakable algorithms for encrypting and decrypting 
digital data. These are even available to the general public in the fonn of freely available 
software, e.g., the "Pretty Good Privacy" package, by P. Zimmerman [2]. 
However, there is an important problem with the use of cryptography in personal 
communications: it is easily detected. Encrypted data are usualiy quite identifiable by its statistical 
characteristics alone. If enciphered communications employ, as is often the case, tell-tale headers 
such as "BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE," the situation is all the more obvious. 
And since encrypted communications are currently the exception rather than the rule, its use may 
be perceived as conspicuous. Even if the message is unbreakably encrypted, the aroused 
suspicion may lead resourceful attackers to pursue alternative means to violating the privacy of 
the communicating parties. 
1 The two are obviously interrelated, as observed by Allen [1].
How can two parties communicate in a way that is both secure and inconspicuous? A related 
question that has extreme political relevance currently is "Can two parties use cryptography 
without its use being easily detected?" In the recent debate about making illegal the use of certain 
encryption algorithms (such as those which are unbreakable by federal agencies), the feasibility of 
detecting the use of forbidden encryption algorithms is tacitly assumed. After all, it is a practical 
impossibility to regulate something that is indetectable. 
Answering these questions requires us to investigate the strange and interesting field of 
steganography. 
1.2 Steganography 
"Steganography" (from Greek, meaning hidden writing) is the art of sending messages in such a 
way that observers other than the intended recipient(s) do not know that a private communication 
is transmitted. The hidden messages themselves may or may not be encrypted. The important 
characteristic of steganographic systems is that the actual messages exchanged look innocuous to 
the eavesdropping observer. Combining cryptography with steganography ensures that the 
plaintext of the hidden message -is not accessible to the attacker, even if she suspects that such a 
message exists by observing the communication. 
1.2.1 Historical examples 
History provides us with many examples of steganography, dating back to the time of the Ancient 
Greeks. The Histories of Herodotus describe how a secret message was sometimes tattooed on 
the shaven head of a messenger [3], [4]. Once the hair had grown back, the messenger was 
dispatched. Upon reaching his destination, the messenger's head was again shaved to reveal the 
hidden message. While this method allowed secret messages to be carried past enemy sentries 
without raising suspicion, it can be said to suffer from a relatively low bandwidth. 
More modern examples of steganographic systems draw largely from secret communications in 
the contexts of warfare or espionage. A variety of "invisible ink" schemes have been used to 
conceal messages within innocent-looking documents. During World War II, the Nazis developed 
a "microdot" technology that allowed photographs the size of a printed period to be enlarged to 
produce images with the clarity of a standard-sized typewritten page [3], [4]. Many other 
examples can be found in [3]. 
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1.2.2 Modern steganography 
Somewhat surprisingly, the academic treatment of steganography has been rather sparse. Some 
theoretical work has been done in the closely related area of subliminal channels [5], and the 
technique of using spread-spectrum technology for indetectable wireless communication can be 
considered one form of steganography. However, unlike the case of cryptography, there are few 
theoretical results which help us produce practical tools for wide-scale steganography in the 
context of modem communication networks. Of course it is also possible that such theoretical 
results have been produced and they were simply too effective at hiding their own messages. 
Figure 1.1 depicts the communication model of interest for contemporary steganograph)'. Note 
that we are assuming that the steganographic system is used to exchange encrypted data. This is 
based on the assumption that if the steganographic scheme fails, the communicating parties will 
still want the messages to be unreadable by the attacker. The cryptographic scheme may be either 
symmetric (the same key used for encryption and decryption) or asymmetric (a message is 
encrypted using the recipient's public key). This choice is usually independent of the 
steganographic system. 
Sender 
Recipient Send 
help, 
Plaintext 
Ks or Ks.public
Encrypt 
Ciphertext 
0100 
1011 
0110 
Steganographic 
Encoding 
K Stego. 
Text, 
Images, 
Audio ... 
Decrypt 
Ciphertext 
Ks or Ks.private 
Steganographic 
Decoding 
Stegotext 
Dear 
Ted,!---
Stegotext 
Figure I. I. Communication model of modern steganography 
3 
The "stegotext" may be text, image data, sound data, or data of any number of other formats. 
The schemes introduced in this document hide messages in text. And as the class of these novel 
systems has been given the name "bonzo-coding,"2 we will use the word "bonzotext" to refer to
the stegotext that is exchanged by parties using these particular schemes. 
The attacker is assumed to have access to the fo1lowing information: 
• All stegotext exchanged
• Full knowledge of the algorithms used for both cryptography and steganography
• Any desired statistical information about the data format used as stegotext.
The requirement that the attacker know everything about the algorithms employed is called 
"Kerckhoffs assumption [6]," and is standard in cryptographic disciplines. For a practical 
steganographic system, we must not depend on the secrecy of the choice of information hiding 
algorithms. 
A steganographic scheme may or may not require keying material in addition to that which is used 
by the cryptosystem. Ideally, keys would not be needed for encoding or decoding the stegotext, 
and this (along with the Kerckhoff assumption) implies that the attacker would have direct access 
to the ciphertext. We will see that this does not always compromise the security of the 
steganographic system. In general, the use of keys with steganography can be helpful in preventing 
the attacker from obtaining information used to detect hidden messages in the stegotext. 
It is also worth noting that while the attacker is assumed to possess an extensive corpora and 
accurate statistics of the data type- used for hiding messages, he does not necessarily have the 
same data held by the sender and/or receiver. For example, the attacker may have a huge archive 
of digital audio samples, along with high-quality statistics and models describing them; however, 
the sender and perhaps also the receiver may use particular audio samples that the attacker does 
not possess. 
Finally, note that the statistical properties of the ciphertext X are assumed to be known by the 
attacker, and we may reasonably assume that these statistics match those of white noise. That is, any 
decent encryption algorithm produces data which may be accurately modeled as a random sequence 
with each bit or byte being independent and uniformly distributed. The independence of each bit 
means that guessing a particular bit value of Xis not aided by knowing any of the other bit values. 
2 By naming these steganographic systems after the primate of movie fame, the author hopes to emphasize their 
architectural simplicity. 
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1.2.3 Objectives 
To study the effectiveness and practicality of different steganographic systems, we use the 
following set of objectives, listed in approximate order of importance: 
1. Unambiguous encoding
The recipient must be able to decode the stegotext without error and recover the ciphertext 
( or plaintext, when encryption is not used separately) intact.
2. Minimal shared information
It would be impractical to require that communicating parties share large amounts of secret 
data in order to communicate innocuously. It might be acceptable to require that they share 
a common passphrase. However, the sender and receiver must not be made to share large 
databases (e.g., sets of images or long wordlists needed for the steganographic system), 
particularly if discovery of these files would incriminate the communicating parties, or if they 
can only be used for a small number of steganographic exchanges. 
3. lndetectability
Simply put, attackers must not be able to easily tell the difference between stegotext and 
communications without hidden messages. It is of primary importance that the attacker not 
be able to use- automatic techniques, such as computerized statistical analyses, to reliably 
detect when the communication involves steganography. 
4. Maximal bandwidth
The amount of stegotext required to send one byte of ciphertext should be minimized. 
Acceptable expansion ratios wi11 depend upon the nature of the channel (whether it is based 
on text, digital audio, image data, etc.). 
5. Time efficiency
The time required to petform the steganographic encoding and decoding should also be 
minimized. This includes both "the computation time required to encode or decode a 
particular message, as well as the human effort involved in configuring the system to 
exchange one or several messages. 
5 
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As we survey steganographic systems, we will notice several tradeoffs inherent in their design. 
Usually, the systems with the least shared information and highest time efficiency are also the 
most detectable. Similarly, to have a maximally indetectable coding scheme, we frequently 
require a great deal of shared information, computation ti�e or preparation effort. A practical 
steganographic system must achieve a balance of these parameters 3.ppropriate for the 
communication environment of interest. 
1,2.4 Steganography with image and sound data 
Recently, there has been a fair amount of attention devoted to the problem of how to embed 
encrypted data within digital images or audio data. A number of systems that accomplish this are 
available today [4], and most are based on the premise that the format used to store image and 
audio data is usually of such high precision that slight alterations of the data itself will not be 
perceivable to the human observer. 
The typical scenario for audiO steganography is as follows (the case of image data is similar). The 
sender generates or chooses a digital audio file of sufficient length and resolution. Using a 
steganographic encoder, the least significant bit(s) of all or some of the audio samples are 
replaced with the bits of the ciphertext and the resulting audio file is sent to the recipient. To the 
human listener, this new audio file will be practically indistinguishable from the original version. 
In order to decode the data, the recipient must either have the original audio file (in which case, 
the bits of the ciphertext are found by comparing the received with the original data), or know 
which audio samples contain bits of the ciphertext. Note that the data format must be such that 
the ciphertext is recovered without error, which usually requires the use of formats that are either 
uncompressed or use lossless compression. 
There are currently several available software packages for hiding ciphertext in images and sound 
using common data formats, and most are surveyed in [4]. The more advanced systems employ a 
random sequence generator (seeded with a passphrase known to sender and receiver) to select the 
locations of samples whose least-significant bit(s) are replaced by bits of the ciphertext. All of 
these systems are based on the questionable assumption that the statistics of the least-significant 
bits in audio or image data are indetectably similar to those of ciphertext. A thorough statistical 
analysis of the nature of image or audio files before and after these steganographic encodings has 
yet to be published. 
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However, the most problematic aspect of these systems, with respect to their use in private 
communications between parties on the Internet, is that they obviously require the exchange of 
(potentially large) image or sound files. Currently, this sort of multimedia-media communication 
is still somewhat rare, and many of us have never before sent an audio or image file to someone 
else. For such an individual to suddenly start exchanging a large amount of graphics or digital 
audio might be significantly conspicuous. Furthermore, we must use images or audio files for 
which the attacker does not have the original versions; otherwise, detection would be as simple as 
finding the original file and comparing it with the transmitted version. Thus, we effectively 
require that each sending party generate large collections of image or audio data and keep these 
collections secret from attackers (i.e., we cannot simply use selections from online graphics 
archives). 
In fact, the vast majority of electronic, person-to-person communications in environments such as 
the Internet consists entirely oftextual information. So while image-based and audio-based 
steganographic tools are very useful, they do not offer a solution that is immediately deployable 
and usable on a wide scale in the current network environment. 
An interesting variation on the image-based scheme involves hiding information by means of 
varying the spacing of words on a document in PostScript3 or a similar page-layout format [7]. 
This work has received a fair amount of study and is of prime interest to publishers wishing to 
embed indetectable "watermarks" in documents. Unfortunately, documents of these types are also 
not regularly exchanged as a part of interpersonal communications. 
To allow for practical steganography in environments such as today's Internet, we must turn to 
techniques which hide information in text. For the remainder of this document, we will concern 
ourselves only with text-based approaches. 
1.3 Previous Work 
1.3.1 Simple text steganographic schemes 
It is useful to consider several interesting, ad-hoc text steganographic systems that can either be 
found in literary works, or contrived using simple, computer-assisted methods. These systems are 
not themselves useful for wide-scale, indetectably secure communications; however, they do 
i1lustrate the range of text manipulation techniques available to us for these purposes. 
3 PostScript is a trademark of Adobe Systems, Inc.
---- ----·-�-�------- ------
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1.3.1.1 Acrostics and subliminal sentences 
A number of writing styles involve the hiding of messages within text, with varying levels of 
detectability. If we allow these messages to include higher-order concepts such as the meaning of 
a particular story (i.e., the stegotext being the same as the 11subtext"), there are innumerable 
examples of this in poetry and literature in general. For our purposes, we restrict our attention to 
steganographic schemes that embed specific data. 
An "acrostic" is a form of writing (usually poetry) in which the letters of the hidden message are 
found in the concatenation of the first letter of the first word in every line. Lewis Carron, author 
of Alice in Wonderland and mathematician as well, was particularly fond of this style and its 
variations. One of his acrostic poems is shown in Fig. 1.2. [8] 
Love Among The Roses 
"Seek ye Love, ye fairy-sprites? 
Ask where reddest roses grow. 
Rosy fancies he invites 
And in roses he delights, 
Have ye found him?" "Not" 
"Seek again, and find the boy 
In Childhood's heart, so pure and clear. 11 
Now the fairies leap for joy, 
Crying, "Love is here!" 
"Love has found his proper nest; 
And we guard him while he dozes 
In a dream of peace and rest 
Rosier than roses." 
Jan. 3, 1878 
Figure 1.2. An acrostic by Lewis Carroll 
Taking the first letter of each line, we learn the name of the inspiration of this poem, one Sarah 
Sinclair. Some of Carroll's other poems used different letters of each line and a few of these 
works require nontrivial effort to discover the encoding algorithm. 
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"Subliminal sentences" carry this idea a step further by encoding a message using the first letter of 
every word. In the news poem shown in Fig. 1.3, concatenating the first letter of each word gives 
rise to a new text. 
Individuals distill essentialized nativist types into themselves, yes. People organize 
limited identities, toppling into competing sisterhoods. Protect equal rights, pre­
empt established types, universally attend to everyone. "Freedom" establishes the 
isolated, select, haphazard individual's zealously erratic diagonal. Individual nihilist 
justice: United States totalitarianism internalizes competitive economics socially. 
Figure 1.3. A subliminal sentence news poem by William Gillespie 
These particular writing styles are obviously not well-suited for private communications, as their 
plaintext is easily discovered. However, note that the message in Fig. 1.4 was actually sent by a 
German spy during World Warn [3], [4]: 
Apparently neutral's protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman 
hard hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on 
by-products, ejecting suets and vegetable oils. 
Figure 1.4. Variation on subliminal sentence sent during W'\VIl 
Taking the second letter in each word produces the message, "Pershing sails from NY June I," 
where the final "i" is interpreted as a "1." 
We could consider a scheme in which acrostics or subliminal sentences are used to encode 
encrypted data, rather than plaintext. For example, four-bit chunks of the ciphertext could be 
mapped to 16 of the most frequently used first letters of English words. The resulting expansion 
ratio for the subliminal sentence approach would be approximately 10: 1 (assuming an average of 
five characters per word), which is not extreme. It is even conceivable that a computer could 
generate natural language with these constraints, which would reduce the human effort required 
for each message. The main concern is that the subliminal sentences look like human-written text, 
both statistically and qualitatively. The bonzo-coding schemes introduced in this document are, in 
some ways, generalizations of this approach which allow us to address this concern. 
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1.3.1.2 Space-coding 
A trivially simple method of encoding data in human-generated text files is to add a variable 
number of spa:ces at the end of each line. In this way, a given line of text may have between one 
and seven spaces appended, depending on the value of each 3-bit chunk of the ciphertext. To the 
casual eavesdropper, the stegotext will look ostensibly the same as the original text, when 
displayed using most text editors. 
This is an example of a system that is completely detectable if the steganographic encoding and 
decoding algorithms are known to the attacker. The fact that most text messages exchanged in 
email and the like do not contain spaces at the end of lines would make the stegotext quite 
conspicuous. 
1.3.1.3 Smooch-coding 
In the domain of human-generated text, wherever there are multiple alternatives that are 
considered equally valid, there is potential for information hiding. To illustrate this useful 
heuristic, we consider the case of multiple spellings of a word. Anyone who has witnessed or 
participated in the exchange of flowery messages between two sweethearts has probably noticed 
that there is no rigid standard for the spelling of certain onomatopoetic outbursts. If the choice of 
spelling for each instance of these words is a function of the value of the ciphertext, then we have 
an adorable steganographic system. 
The author has implemented a crude (but cute) version of this scheme based on the variable 
spelling of the word "smooch." The sender creates a template, indicating the locations where this 
emoticon may be placed (see Fig. 1.5). Then for each byte of the ciphertext, the encoder creates 
an instance of the word "smooch!" with a particular number of occurrences of each letter. The 
resulting message is sent to the recipient, who may deccxie it without requiring any additional 
information. 
10 
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<> Heilo Honey! 
I hope you are having a nice morning. <> <> 
(you can tell that I miss you-- I just wanna<> you all day) 
<><> (see?) 
Oh, the box of chocolates you sent arrived this morning. <> 
You're ever so thoughtful! <> I'm hoping you receive the 
sweater I knit for you either in today's mail or tomorrow's. 
Gosh I wish you were hear right now so I could<> your face! 
<><><> 
When did you say you would be done with that stupid conference? ( <>) 
Well, I've got a busy day ahead ofme, I hope I survive it! <> 
Thinking of you constantly will certainly help. 
I'll be accumulating kisses in your absence -- so don't be surprised if you walk through 
the door and get attacked by <> <> 
Missing you desperately, 
-- The <> Monster 
p.s. <> <> <>
Figure 1.5. Example template used for smooch-coding 
The source code for the encoder, "ENSMOOCH.C," and the decoder, "DESMOOCH.C," are 
given in Sections A.1 and A.2. A sample template file is shown in Fig. 1.5 (with the smooch 
locations specified by "<>"), and Fig. 1.6 shows the stegotext output produced by the encoder for 
this template. 
The expansion ratio of this scheme is roughly 40: 1, which is probably not acceptable. The work 
required by the sender for each message is also exorbitant. And it could be argued that the 
attacker is likely to be so nauseated by the stegotext that the communicating parties will be 
persecuted in any case. This scheme is interesting primarily for its illustrative qualities (or 
entertainment value) rather than its security. 
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SMOOOOOOCH!! Hello Honey! 
I hope you are having a nice morning. SSSMMMOOCH! ! ! SSMMMOOOOOCH 
(you can tell that I miss you -- I just wanna SSSMMMMOOOOOOCH you all day) 
SSSSMMMMOOOCH!!! SSSMMOOOOCH!! (see?) 
Oh, the box of chocolates you sent arrived this morning. SMOOOOOOOOOCH 
You're ever so thoughtful! SSSMMMMOOOCH! I'm hoping you receive the 
sweater I knit for you either in today's mail or tomorrow's. 
Gosh I wish you were hear right now so I could SSSSMMMOOOOOOCH! l ! your face! 
SSSMMMOOOOOOOOOCH!! SSMMOOOOOOOCH!!! SMMMOOCH! 
When did you say you would be done with that stupid conference? (SSSMMMMOOOOOCH! ! ! ) 
Well, I've got a busy day ahead of me. I hope I survive it! SSSMMOOOOCH 
Thinking of you constantly will certainly help. 
I'll be accumulating kisses in your absence - so don't be surprised if you walk through 
the door and get attacked by SMMMMOOCH! SSSS:M1.1000000CH! ! ! 
Missing you desperately, 
-- The SMMOOOOOCH! ! Monster 
p.s. SSSMMMMOOOOOOOCH!! SSSSMMMMOOOCH!! SSSM:MMMOOOOOOCH
Figure 1.6. Output of encoder with hidden message "Please return my albums." 
1.3.1.4 Texto 
Texto, by K. Maher [9J, is a rudimentary text steganography program which transforms ASCil 
data into simple English sentences and back again. Since ciphertext can be stored in ASCII 
format (using uuencode or PG P's ASCIT-arrnoured mode, for example), this system may be used 
to hide encrypted data in English text. 
The natural language generation basis of Texto is similar to that of the bonzo-coding schemes 
presented here, only it is much less general. The encoder uses a file containing specifications of 
several sentence structures (templates) along with lists of 64 words of each of the following types: 
verbs, adjectives, adverbs, places, and things. The sentence templates are of the form shown in 
Fig. 1.7. 
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"The _THING _ADVERB _ VERBS to the _ADJECTIVE _PLACE. " 
"Shall we _VERB before the _ADJECTIVE _THINGS _VERB?" 
Figure 1.7. Sample template sentence structures for Texto 
During the encoding process, a template is chosen (sequentially from the structures file) and each 
of the placeholders is replaced by one of the words in the corresponding list. The word chosen 
from the list depends on the value of the next six bits of the ciphertext stream. For example, given 
structures above and the input ciphertext stream "n 1 n2 n3 ••. " (where each n is a six-bit number), it 
would insert the n1-th word in the ''THING" wordlist into the spot marked by _THING. The 
n2-th adverb would take the place of the first "_ADVERB", and so on. The output would look 
something like the text shown in Fig. 1.8. 
"The can lustily restrains to the quick swamp." 
"Shall we sniff before the opaque balls slide?" 
Figure 1.8. Sample output of Texto 
To transform this stegotext back into the original ciphertext, the decoder scans the stegotext for 
words which are present in its word lists (the same lists used during encoding). When it finds 
such a word, it outputs the 6-bit number corresponding to that word's place in its list. All of these 
6-bit numbers are concatenated to form the original ciphertext file.
While the output of Texto can look similar to human-generated text, it suffers from a number of 
limitations. The most serious drawback is that the sender and receiver must both share the same 
word lists. Since it would be infeasible to change lists for every communication, the use of this 
encoding scheme would be rather easily detected by looking for repeated use of words of each 
predefined type (verbs, adjectives, adverbs, places, and things). The fixed 6-bit per word 
conversion rule is also somewhat limiting. Both of these weaknesses are addressed by the bonzo­
coding schemes. 
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1.3.2 Mimic functions 
The most academically sound work done to date in the area of text steganography is found in 
Peter Wayner's papers on "mimic functions." These functions use Huffman compression and 
expansion functions to reversibly transform one random sequence so that it has a distribution 
approximating that of another sequence. Wayner shows in [IO] that these transformations are 
optimal in the sense that they produce the shortest length se.quences with the desired distribution. 
As mimic functions are part of one of the bonzo-coding designs, we briefly describe them now. 
We wish to produce Y as a function of random sequence X (the ciphertext) such that Y has the 
one-dimensional distribution of random sequence H, the characters in human-generated text. Let 
fH() be a Huffman compression function which assigns variable-length binary strings to the fixed­
length binary strings of its input, using a Huffman tree generated from the probability distribution 
ofH. Sirnilarly, 1etgH() be the corresponding Huffman decompression function which uses the 
same Huffman tree to recover fixed-length binary strings corresponding to the variable-length 
binary strings of its input. Wayner shows that if Xis an independent, uniformly distributed 
random sequence, and we compute 
(I. I) 
then Y wi11 have approximately the distribution of H, with Prob[Y=y] equal to the negative power 
of two nearest to Prob[H=y]. Note that since g8() is an expansion function, Y will be longer than
X. To recover X from Y, we use the Huffman compression function, setting
(1.2) 
Without a great deal of difficulty, we can extend this scheme so that Y has an n-dimensional 
:listribution approximating that of H. 
·wayner describes two ways of creating "mimic functions" based on these transformations: one is
:haracter-based and the other word-based. In the character-based scheme, Y is a sequence of
1-grams (character sequence of length n) which has approximately then-dimensional distribution
if the human-generated text analyzed. As shown by Shannon as early as 1951 [11] and
lemonstrated in [12] and [13], among others, randomly generating n-grarns in this way can
1rovide an interesting and remarkably accurate imitation of the text used in the statistical analysis
tage. The occurrence of nonsense words and the nongrammatical sentences will make the
omputer-generated nature of Y obvious to the human observer. However, this type of mimic
mction will effectively fool automated detection attacks based solely on the n-dimensional
istribution of characters in text.
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The second type of mimic function involves generating words from a Context-Free Grammar 
(CFG). A CFO is a system of production rules and literal strings, and its syntax may be hke the 
example shown in Fig. 1.9. In this case, a PET is a variable which may take the value of either 
"dog" or "cat." The alternatives available for each production rule may be assigned a probability, 
as indicated by the numbers in parentheses. 
Sentence-> �My" PET "has" PROBLEM ". H 
PET -> "dog" (.5) 
PROBLEM -> "fleas" (. 6) 
"cat" (.5) 
"the flu" (.3) I "rabies" (.1) 
Figure 1.9. Example Context-Free Grammar production rules 
To use CFGs with mimic functions, we start with a CFG with all production rule alternatives 
assigned probabilities corresponding to their likelihood in human-generated text (this likelihood 
determined by fiat or analyzing a particular corpus). The alternatives are then arranged as a 
Huffman tree like the one shown below in Fig. 1.10. 
"My" "has" 
Figure 1.10. Huffman tree for the example CFG mimic function 
Note if we generate a "Sentence" by making purely random choices at each of the branching 
nodes, we wiII have PET equal to "dog" half of the time and PET equal to "cat" the other half. 
Similarly, our pet will have "fleas" half of the time, and "the flu" and "rabies" each one fourth of 
the time. These probabilities are exactly those specified in the CFG production rules in the case of 
"cat" and "dog." The values of the variable PROBLEM occur with probabilities that are the 
negative power of two closest to the specified probabilities. 
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The steganographic encoding system involves using the bits of the input ciphertext to make the 
choices at all decision branches of the CFG. Assuming the Sentence defined above appears first in 
the stegotext, it will contain the word "dog" if the first bit is "O" and "cat" if this bit is "I." Since 
the ciphertext is assumed to be white noise, the word probabilities wiII approximately match those 
specified in the CFG production rules. To decode the stegotext the recipient must have access to 
the same CFG (and thus its corresponding Huffman tree). Then the decoding process becomes a 
task of parsing the CFG to see which choices were made in the encoding process. The bits of the 
ciphertext are thus revealed. Note that for an unambiguous encoding of the ciphertext, we require 
that the CFG be unambiguous. That is, for every possible string in the stegotext, there must only 
be one set of production rules that can generate it 
The output stegotext of the CFG-based mimic function can be quite human-looking. Assuming 
the probabilities assigned to the CFO production rule alternatives are accurate, the stegotext will 
have a word distribution approximating that of human-generated text. The expansion ratio is not 
easily computed, although the example in [10] suggest a ratio of roughly 80:1. 
Wayner points out that the indetectability of the CFG-based mimic functions is hampered by the 
fact that output distributions are effectively rounded to the nearest negative power of two. 
However, the fundamental weakness of this scheme is that it requires the sender and receiver to 
share a large amount of information. These CFGs are specific to a particular domain of human 
writing (the corpus analyzed to produce the production rule probabilities), and they must be kept 
out of the hands of attackers. In [14], Wayner asserts that these mimic functions can be made "as 
secure as RSA or factoring Blum integers," but this is only true in the sense that it is difficult for 
the attacker to derive a CFG which would generate the observed stegotext. If the attacker 
somehow obtains the CFG used, the security is lost since the attacker may then readily identify 
stegotext. 
1.4 Contribution of Bonzo�coding 
The aim of the novel schemes presented in this thesis to enable text steganography that is practical 
and suitable for use on the Internet today. These systems achieve a level of indetectability 
comparable to that of CFG-based mimic functions while requiring a minimum of shared 
information held between sender and receiver. The bandwidth of these schemes is at least 
comparable and potentially far superior to that of mimic functions or other text-based 
steganographic systems surveyed. 
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We shall assume that the plain text of the hidden messages sent with these schemes are fairly short 
(roughly between one and several lines of text). If larger data sets are to be sent using these 
systems, they will have to be broken into smaller chunks and sent using multiple bonzotext 
messages. Practically speaking, we consider the occasion to transmit large data sets innocuously 
to be far less frequent than the desire to exchange short hidden messages. Steganographic 
systems based on hiding information in image or audio data would probably be more appropriate 
for the frequent exchange of large data sets. 
1.5 Organization of This Document 
In the remainder of this document, we present a class of novel schemes for perforating text 
steganography. Four designs are e.xplained in Chapter 2, and the implementation of one of the 
designs is explained in Chapter 3. The results obtained from the implemented system are 
discussed in Chapter 4, including the discussion of several statiSticaJ analyses on the system 
output. Sample stegotext produced by the implemented system can be found in Sections C. l, 
C.2, and C.3. Finally, Chapter 5 offers a few conclusions drawn from this work and suggests
directions for future work in this area
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CHAPTER 2. BONZO-CODING SYSTEMS 
2. ·1 Bonzo-Coding Fundamentals
2.1.1 Coding model and message fonnat 
The steganographic encoder is called the "bonzifier" while the decoder is called the "debonzifier." 
The format of the bonzotext is the same for all bonzo-coding schemes. There is a "Prelude" 
which is a short section that carries no hidden data. This is followed by the "bonzoblock, '' the 
section containing aU of the stegotext data. The document may contain text after the bonzoblock 
which is called the "Ending" section. The Prelude and Ending sections may be human-generated 
or output by the language generation system used to create the bonzoblock. All that we require 
are that a Prelude be present and that the start of the bonzoblock be identifiable by the 
debonzifier. There are many ways of implementing the bonzo-coding system such that this 
constraint is met (see Chapter 3). 
Bonzo-coding makes use of functions that convert words, expressed as ASCII strings, to 
numerical values. When we do not care about the specific algorithm used for this conversion, we 
use the notation 11f(w)" as the function assigning a numerical value to the word w. Usually, we 
are only interested in � bits of the result, where pis considered a constant for a particular instance 
of bonzotext (generally p is in the range of one to seven bits). This function must be a true 
function, in that we may only have one possible output for a particular input. However, f(·) may 
Je a many-to-one, i.e., it is possible that f(wj) = f(wj) for i ,t:. j.
We define a simple algorithm to be used to implement f(·). "h(w)" is a simple hash function which 
tdds the characters together and takes the lower p bits of the result. h(·) ignores punctuation 
1,1ithin a word, as well as the case of the first letter in the word. The reason for this is that the 
1uman sender may wish to change the fonnatting, punctuation, and some of the capitalization of 
he stegotext without altering its hidden data. Note that the output of h(·) will be the same for the 
vords "tender loin" as "rented lion" since the sequence of the characters does not affect the value 
f the hash. 
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The words of the bonzoblock are chosen by the bonzifier such that their value under f( ·) is the 
ciphertext data X. That is, 
x, = f(w;) (2.1) 
where wi is a particular word in the bonzoblock and xi is the corresponding b bits of the 
ciphertext. AlI words in the bonzoblock that correspond to a value of X are called "coded 
words." In implementing the bonzo·coding schemes, we may wish to have additional information 
carried in the bonzob1ock, most notably the length of the hidden ciphertext (when the decoder 
must stop decoding). The details of accomplishing this are discussed in Section 3.3. For now, it 
is safe to assume that the coded words contain only values of X. 
The simplicity of the decoding algorithm is the main distinguishing characteristic of bonzo-coding. 
All that is necessary to recover the ciphertext is for the decoder to perform the calculation in Eq. 
(2.1) for each coded word in the bonzoblock. There is no parsing of Context-Free Grammars 
needed, even if a CFG was used as a part of the bonzification process. Thus, the shared 
information required between sender and recipient is minimized. In some of the systems 
presented below, the calculation off(·) requires a shared passphrase. But this is not an 
unreasonable requirement and we may still consider the shared information minimal. 
The price paid Jor the extreme simplicity of the debonzifier is that the bonzifier must not only 
produce bonzotext which looks human-generated, statistically and qualitatively; the coded words 
it selects must also have the correct value underf(·). We argue that these requirements are not 
mutually exclusive. In the systems presented here, the bonzifier is essentially a natural language 
generation engine which attempts to produce text which satisfies both of these constraints. 
2.1.2 Notation 
The following notation and definitions are used for the remainder of this document: 
w 
human text 
Any word as defined by a character string not containing spaces or 
carriage returns (it may contain punctuation such as ". ", ";", ""'). 
The word sequence of the bonzoblock, modeled as a random sequence. 
Shorthand for "human-generated text." 
19 
x 
X; 
[opt] 
Prob[A I BJ 
k 
f(w) 
p 
Lx 
Lb 
Lw 
A random sequence of words with distribution like that of humantext. 
The ciphertext stream, modeled as a random sequence of independent, 
uniformly distributed random variables (a white noise sequence). 
A particular bitstring of sequence X. Xi is a unifonn random variable. 
The concatenation of bitstrings x1, x2, and x3. If each bitstring is four bits
long, then this result is equivalent to x1-2S + x2·24 + x3.
The word concatenation of ASCII strings w1 , w2, and w3 (which do not 
themselves contain spaces). These strings are separated by at least a space 
or carriage return. Commas and other punctuation are also allowed. 
An optional value, usually an ASCII string. 
The probability of event A given event B. 
The bits-per-word value used for an encoding. 
The alphabet size of each codeword, i.e., k = 2�. 
A text-to-numeric transformation mapping word into a P-bit code value. 
The padding value, with O::.; p .s 7� p/8 indicates the approximate number 
of noncoded words for each encoded word. If p=O then all words in body 
are encodings. 
The number of bytes in the ciphertext input file. 
The number of coded words in the bonzoblock. 
The total number of words in the bonzoblock. 
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2.2 System l: Simple Word-hashing 
2.2.1 Description 
The first system is the simplest and also the most limited. The operations of the bonzifier and 
debonzifier are depicted in Fig. 2.1 and may be summarized by the following points: 
• f(w) := h(w).
• Each word in the bonzoblock is a coded word.
Bonzifier 
i CFG W' •; 1 W 
! Engine
L-.i' I 
·1 h(·) I
·····-· ············· ···· .. ············- .. , ........................................... ...... , 
x 
Bonzotext Debonzifier 
!�-�� ;,_/ _w_,:--..,� i, .......................... · •X
Figure 2.1. Block diagram of System 1 
Bonzotext 
The bonzifier first breaks the ciphertext input into P-sized chunks, x 1 , x2, •.. , xLb· Since Lb is the 
number of p-sized chunks needed to represent the Lx bytes of X, we have 
Lb =L8·Lx/ pJ, (2.2) 
where LyJ is the least integer greater than or equal to the real-valued quantity y. For simplicity, 
:onsider the CFG engine as generating a sequence W' of candidate words. To determine if a 
particular candidate w is acceptable for the i-th position of the bonzoblock, the bonzifier simply 
::hecks ifh(w) = x1. This is a sort of "word filter" applied to the stream W' produced by the CFG 
:ngine. 
[n actuality, the bonzifier may be a tightly coupled combination of the natural language generator 
md the word filter. As a candidate linguistic structure (perhaps a phrase, sentence, or complete 
>aragraph) is chosen from the language specified for it, each coded word location is checked. If,
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for instance, the first few such words in a candidate sentence have the correct code values but the 
last one does not, the bonzifier may search for a word with the correct c<Xl.e value to replace the 
last word. In other words, it need not be an unintelligent generator that produces all possible 
linguistic structures and then look for ones with the proper coded words. This matter is discussed 
further in Section 3.6. 
The task of the debonzifier is trivial. It simply computes Eq. (2.I) for each word wi of the 
bonzoblock. It performs a binary concatenation of the �-bit values xi to recover the original 
sequence X intact. Note that here we are assuming that the debonzifier knows Lx, the length of 
X in bytes, a priori. Section 3.3 discusses how this length information may, for convenience, be 
prepended to the ciphertext stream before encoding. 
2.2.2 Analysis 
This simple bonzo-coding system is primarily useful for illustrating the general scheme under 
investigation. It does achieve unambiguous textual encoding with minimal shared information, 
and the output bonzotext can look qualitatively like human-generated text if the CFG is carefully 
constructed. 
As with all the bonzo-coding systems, the expansion ratio depends at least on the value of P used 
for a particular instance of bonzotext. If Lw is the average word length, then our expansion ratio 
is given by (S·Lw IP): 1. Since the useful range of� was observed to be between 2 and 6, and 
assuming an average word length of five characters (a conservative estimate), we achieve 
expansion ratios roughly between 7: 1 and 40:1. This ignores the characters of the Prelude and 
Ending sections of the bonzotext, as well as the punctuation between words of the bonzoblock. 
Therefore we may consider this a crude lower bound to the expansion ratio of this scheme. 
Nonetheless, the bandwidth achievable by this system is within usable limits; we can make use of a 
system that has 30 lines of bonzotext for a line of hidden text. 
The computational efficiency is different for the sender and the recipient. The debonzification 
algorithm is a trivial computation, which runs in negligible time on personal computers and 
workstations. The time spent performing the decryption of the ciphertext is larger by at least an 
order of magnitude. 
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The time required by the bonzifier to encode a particular message might be much longer. If the 
CFO has too few alternatives for its production rules, then an error-free encoding may be either 
impossible or a slow computation. Experience to date has found this bonzification time to be 
anywhere from a couple of seconds to several minutes. These times are not considered 
unreasonable. The real implementation challenge is to make a CFO engine that does not require 
much "tweaking" on the part of the user (the sender) in order to attain an error-free encoding of 
the ciphertext. Such topics are discussed later in this document. Note that in this simple scheme, 
the value of h(w) may be precomputed by the bonzifier for all words win a particular CFO. 
This leads us to an interesting tradeoff involved in using any bonzo-coding scheme. If f3 is chosen 
to be low ({3 = 1 or 2), then it is much easier and quicker for the bonzifier to produce an error-free 
encoding using a particular CFO. But for low values of f3, our expansion ratio will be fairly large, 
thereby lowering the achievable system bandwidth. On the other hand, if we use higher values of 
13, (13 = 7 or 8), our bonzotext is much more compact but the bonzification time is longer and the 
chance of producing an error-free encoding from a given CFG is lower. In practice, producing a 
bonzotext with a particular CFG often requires trying a few different values of !3. 
Another factor that makes both the bonzifier's task difficult and the bonzotext less human-looking 
is that we require each word of the bonzoblock to carry a code value. There are solutions to this 
problem, one of which is presented in the design of ·subsequent bonzo-coding Systems. 
2.2.3 Detectability 
The hash function h(-) should ideally have independently distributed, uniform output when given 
the random sequence WH. If this is so, then h(W H) will be statistically indistinguishable fro.m 
h(Wa) (which is the same as X) and the attacker will therefore not be able to distinguish between 
bonzotext and humantext based on the output of the debonzifier. However, the distribution of 
W H is far from uniform and independent. This is due to the simple fact that humans do not use all 
words with equal frequency, and particular word sequences are far more likely than others (e.g., 
he pair "my money" is used far more often than the pair "my your"). So generating. uniform, 
:ndependent output of h(WH) will require using a very small number of bits (i.e., 13 = I) and/or 
iefining a different hash algorithm for h(·) which takes into account the distribution of WH. 
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How distinct are the measurable distributions of h(W u) and h(W B) for the simple hash algorithm 
specified? Simulation results described in Section 4.4 indicate that they may be identified fairly 
reliably using Chi-squared tests or entropy measurements based on the one-dimensional 
distributions of h(WH) and hCWal alone. Thus, the indetectability of System I is thought to be 
rather poor. 
Since h(·) is permitted to be a many-to-one function, we can consider different hash algorithms 
which have a uniform output when given the input WH. This is the approach taken in the design 
of System 4 (see Section 2.5). Accomplishing this can be difficult, so we next consider simple 
ways of divorcing the statistics off(·) from the nonuniform distribution of WH. 
2.3 System 2: Word Padding and Hash Scrambling 
2.3.1 Description 
This system improves on the statistics of System 1 while requiring a small amount of additional 
shared information. It also frees us from the requirement that every word in the bonzoblock be a 
coded word. The system is shown in Fig. 2.2 and may be summarized by the following points: 
• f(w) := h(w) EB r, where r is the value of a pseudo-random sequence.
• Word padding is used to allow for noncoded words in the bonzoblock.
In this diagram we see the addition of a new sequence, R. Risa sequence that is either one of 
several "constant" sequences known to sender, recipient and attacker, or it is the output of a 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) whose values are not known to the attacker. In the 
latter case, we may implement R using a cryptographically strong PRNG seeded with a passphrase 
shared by sender and recipient but unguessable by the attacker. The sequence R serves two 
purposes: it determines which of the words in the bonzoblock are coded words, and it "whitens" 
the output of the simple hash function h( · ). We consider each of these roles in turn. 
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Figure 2.2. Block diagram of System 2 
2.3.2 Word Padding 
•. 
Allowing noncoded words to appear in the bonzoblock makes it easier for the bonzifier to come 
up with an error-free encoding which has the desired word statistics. It may be true that the 
attacker's job is complicated by not knowing exactly which words of the bonzotext represent code 
values, but the added security is not considered to be substantial. The sender specifies the amount 
of ''word padding" to be used by giving a parameter p to the bonzifier. If p is equal to zero, then 
all words in the bonzoblock must be coded words. Higher values of p signify that more noncoded 
words should appear in the bonzoblock. 
The bonzifier determines which words in the bonzoblock are coded words by processing the 
sequence R with a function e(·) that gives a yes/no binary output for each word in the bonzoblock. 
[f we treat R as a white noise random sequence, then e(R) is simply a function that converts the 
independent, unifonnly distributed bytes of R into a one-bit random variable which has Prob[no] 
?roportional top. We may implemente(·) as a simple look-up table. 
\laturally, the debonzifier must know where the bonzifier put the coded words in the bonzoblock, 
;o it performs the identical computation of e(R) using the same sequence R employed by the 
,onzifier. Thus R must be known to both the sender and receiver. If R is the output of the 
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PRNG described above, then this means that the communicating parties must share an 
unguessable passphrase. However, it is important to note that even if R is a nonrandom sequence, 
known to sender, recipient and attacker, it can sti11 be useful to us. The constant sequence still 
provides a way to allow noncoded words in the bonzoblock. In Chapter 3, we see that R may be
implemented as a choice of one of several constant sequences which are samples of a white noise 
variable. This obviously does not prevent the attacker from locating the coded words in the 
bonzoblock, but it does allow for better output of the bonzifier. 
2.3.3 Hash Scrambling 
The description above indicates that the word padding mechanism functions whether R is a true 
random sequence or a constant sequence. This is not so for the use of R to whiten the hash 
function output. We first consider the case in which Risa white noise sequence known to the 
sender and recipient but not to the attacker. 
It is a we11-known fact of cryptography that if you Exclusive-Or a random sequence of arbitrary 
distribution with a white noise random sequence, the output is another white noise sequence. 
This is the foundation for the "one-time pad" cryptosystem which is provably the only truly secure 
cipher [15]. Thus, if R is an independent, uniformly-distributed random sequence, and we 
compute 
f(h(W),R) = { f(w,,r,) = h(w,) $ r, }, (2.3) 
then the output of fO is an independent, uniformly-distributed random sequence regardless of the 
distribution of h(W). In the equation above, ri is a P-bit chunk of the sequence R. 
If Ris a constant sequence, then there is no randonmess involved in the calculation off(·). If R 
consists of samples of a white noise sequence, then the bonzifier is likely to have an easier task of 
finding an error-free encoding of the ciphertext since the values off(·) are more uniform. 
However, the detectability arguments of System l will apply. The attacker may easily recover the 
sequence h(wi) by either applying the hash function directly to the words or by computing 
h(w,) = f(h(w;),r;) $ r; (2.4) 
from the output of the debonzifier. Since R is not random, we will have h(W B) distributed as X 
which will be immediately distinguishable from the nonuniform h(W 8).
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2.3.4 Pseudo-code of Algorithms 
To clarify the operation of System 2, the debonzifier algorithm is given in pseudo-code form in 
Fig. 2.3. Note that it is a simple, deterministic algorithm whose runtime is proportional to the 
length of X (or equivalently, the number of words in the bonzoblock). 
for each word win bonzoblock { 
) 
let r = next byte of sequence R 
if e(r) = O then 
ignore w 
else 
next� bits of X = h{w) ffi (lower P bits of r) 
Figure 2.3. Pseudo-code for debonzification algorithm of System 2 
The pseudo-code for the bonzifier algorithm is given in Fig. 2.4. It is an over-simplified example 
of a bonzification algorithm which implements the word filtering stage and considers the CFO 
engine to be independent. 
do [ 
let x = next P bits of sequence x 
do f 
let r = next byte of sequence R 
get candidate word w from CFG 
if e(r) = o then { 
output w to bonzoblock 
found= O 
} else { 
) 
if h(w) EB (lower� bits of r) = x then { 
found = 1 
output w to bonzoblock 
) 
repeat until found=l or all candidates tried 
} repeat until no bits of X remain 
Figure 2.4. Pseudo-code for bonzification algorithm of System 2 
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2.3.5 Analysis 
The expansion ratios for bonzotexts produced by System 2 are increased by a function of the 
padding value p. In the implemented system discussed in Chapter 3, p takes a va1ue between O 
and 7, where p/8 is the expected number of noncoded words for each coded word. Thus, the 
expected va1ue of our crude lower bound on the expansion ratio is (8,Lw I �)·(1 + p/8): 1. For 
the implemented range of p, this yields expansion ratios between roughly 7: 1 and 80: 1. 
The computational efficiency of System 2 is identical to that of System 1 in the case of the 
debonzifier, and slightly improved in the case of the bonzifier. The use of word padding 
effectively reduces the time required to produce an error-free bonzotext, as observed informally in 
experiments. This improvement in encoding speed is partially at the expense of an increased 
expansion ratio for larger values of p. 
In System 1 the bonzotext is easily distinguished from the ciphertext because b(WB) necessarily 
has the distribution of X while h(W H) has a very nonunifonn distribution. In System 2, we no 
longer require that h(W B) be distributed as X. If we can generate bonzotext that has W B 
distributed the same as WH, then we will clearly have h(WB) distributed the same as h(WH). 
Since f(W,R) = h(W) Ell R, we know that f(W,R) will be distributed as X regardless of the 
distribution of h(W). Note that having W8 distributed as WH is a daring assumption which
directly implies that any statistical analysis will fail to distinguish between W 8 and W H·
We conclude that if the bonzotext is constructed with W8 distributed as W H• and the sender and 
recipient share an unguessable passphrase, the attacker will not be able to distinguish between 
bonzotext and human text. The question of how to generate bonzotext that has ·the proper code 
values and the distribution of human text is addressed somewhat in Chapter 5 (using ideas from 
[16]). For now, we simply note that this is theoretically possible by the argument above. 
ft is natural to ask at this point whether or not we can perfonn indetectable bonzo-coding without 
requiring additional shared information (such as the passphrase). This is the aim of the next 
systems considered. 
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2.4 System 3: Mimic Function Processing of Ciphertext 
2.4.1 Description 
In the previous systems, we setf(W8) = X and attempted to make f(WH) look statistically like
ciphertext X while enabling W 8 to look statistically like W tt· Another way of achieving
indetectability is to preprocess X, in a reversible manner, so that it has the statistical distribution 
of f(W H). Mimic functions provide a convenient way of accomplishing this. 
Figure 2.5 shows the design of System 3. It is similar to System 1, with the following additions: 
• We compute Y = gH(X) which has approximately the distribution ofh(W8).
• Y is encoded using the simple hash function h(w).
• X is recovered from Y by computing f H(Y) after decoding the bonzotext.
• Word padding is used, as in System 2, with constant sequence R.
R 
. . . . .................................................. .... ....................................... ....... · 
x 
Bonzotext Debonzifier 
.......... R ..................................................... i 
Figure 2.5. Block diagram of System 3 
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Before any bonzification can take place using this system, we first compute the n-dimensional 
distribution of h(\VH) for a representative corpus of humantext. An appropriate value of n is to be 
found through experimentation. Using this distribution, we construct the corresponding Huffman 
trees in order to create the mimic functions fH(·) and g8(·). 
The Huffman expansion function gH(,) takes variable-length bitstrings and assigns them to fixed­
length bitstrings using the Huffman tree based on the distribution of h(\V H)· In this case, the 
output bitstrings are n·f3 bits in length. As explained in Section 1.3.2, if Xis a white noise random 
sequence, then gH(X) will have approximately the n-dimensional distribution of h(WH). We 
therefore wish to compute Y = g8(X) and use Y as the input to our simple bonzifier. Note that 
since gH( ·) is an expansion function, the length of Y wi1l be longer than that of X (by a relatively 
small constant proportion). 
The debonzifier first computes Y = h(WB) as in System I (with the word padding machinery 
added). Then to recover X, we simply compute X = fH{Y), where fHO is the Huffman 
compression function using the same tree as gH(·). 
The word padding uses one of the known, constant sequences R to select the locations of the 
coded words in the bonzoblock. We do not require R to be a random sequence. The padding is 
only to make it easier for the bonzifier to produce an error-free encoding. Thus, we are not 
requiring any additional passphrases for this system. 
2.4.2 Analysis 
Since Y has approximately then-dimensional distribution of h(WH), the output of the hash 
function should be approximately the same for h(WH) and h(WB)· For a suitable choice of n, we 
will then also have that the output off H(Y) statistically resembles white noise for both Y=h(WH) 
rnd Y=h{WB)· Thus, the attacker will not be able to distinguish between bonzotext and 
:rnmantext based on the observed statistics of Y or the statistics of the debonzifier output. 
?or complete indetectability, we also require that the distribution of W 8 be sufficiently similar to 
W H so that any statistical analysis of the text itself wilI also fail to distinguish between bonzotext 
md humantext. As with System 2, we have made it possible to satisfy this constraint, although 
'Ne have not provided a direct means to do so. 
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The expansion ratio of System 3 is likely to be higher than the previous two systems, because we 
must expand X before encoding it as Y. This expansion, combined with the word padding, may 
stress the limits of acceptable expansion ratios. However, it is difficult to estimate the likely 
expansion ratios without knowing the appropriate ranges for p, p, and n for this system. It is 
possible that since Y is distributed as h(WH), the encoder may have an easier time finding word 
strings with the proper code values, as opposed to the task of finding such strings when the 
encoder input is ciphertext. Thus, we must implement and experiment with the system before 
knowing the useful values of� and p. 
There are some other potential drawbacks to this system. The fact that fHO and gH(·) are specific 
to a particular body of analyzed humantext means that the distribution of our mimic functions will 
be somewhat erroneous when using a CFG corresponding to a different domain of humantext. 
Alternatively, we will require several versions off HO and gH(·) to choose from, or we limit 
ourselves to a single domain of humantext. None of these options are terribly desirable. 
The problem that the Huffman expansion function produces a sequence whose distribution is only 
accurate to the nearest negative power of two may also pose a problem. This might be fixed by 
using a different expansion/compression algorithm. Arithmetic compression [17] is one possibility 
and the use of homophonic ciphers [18] may also offer promise [16]. 
So while System 3 potentially offers improved indetectability without requiring passphrases, there 
must be additional development and experimentation applied to this design before its usefulness is 
known. 
2.5 System 4: Compression of Hash Function Output 
2.5.1 Description 
Finally, we consider the use of word-to-number mappings other than the simple hash function 
specified. System 4 is depicted in Fig. 2.6, and its design may be sununarized by the following 
points: 
• A compression function is used to make fO distributed more like ciphertext.
• The candidate words are considered in sequences of length n.
• Word padding is used, as in Systems 2 and 3, with constant sequence R.
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Figure 2.6. Block diagram of System 4 
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In Section 2.2, we found that by defining f(W) ; h(W), the nonuniformities of W H are clearly 
reflected in the sequence h(WH)· One way of explaining this observation is that the output of our 
simple hash function h(·) is not sufficiently unifonn with WH as its input. We may attempt to 
correct this by employing a different hash function with more suitable output statistics. 
A simple example which illustrates this technique is to process the output of the simple hash 
function hO with a compression function. Consider the Huffman compression function fh(·), 
which uses the a-dimensional distribution of h(W H) to map n-�-bit strings into variable-length 
bitstrings. The output of fh(h(WH)) will have a distribution substantially more unifonn than 
h(W H) itself. 
We make use of this in our bonzo-coding system by assigning 
f(w1, w2, ... , w,); fh(h(w1), h(w2), ... , h(w,) ), (2.5) 
and this word-to-number computation is perfonned identically by both the encoder and decoder. 
The bonzifier ensures that f(wi, wi+J•···· wi+n) is equal to the appropriate bitstring of X for each 
sequence of coded words wi, wi+I•"'' wi+n chosen to appear in the bonzoblock. Similarly, the 
debonzifier computes f(w j , wi+l •·"• wi+n) for each n-length sequence, of coded words in the 
bonzoblock and perfonns a binary concatenation of the results to obtain the ciphertext X. Note 
that we do not need to use the corresponding Huffman expansion function for any reason. 
As in System 3, we may use the word padding system with constant sequence R in order to make 
the bonzifier1s job easier. 
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2.5.2 Analysis 
Assuming that W H is distributed as W B• as before, the indetectability of this system will be fairly
respectable. We are basing our assessment also on the assumption that the compression function 
fh(·) produces sufficiently uniform, independent-looking output when given the input h(W). It is 
possible that compression functions other than the Huffman variety might be better suited for 
satisfying this requirement. 
The expansion ratio of System 3 is likely to be significantly higher than the other systems. This is 
because the average length of the output of fih(W)) will be less than n·l3 bits, so the bonzifier 
requires more n-word sequences to encode a particular sequence X than do the previous systems. 
The resulting expansion factor is thought to be a fairly small constant. As with System 3, we may 
see a higher useful range for B, and/or lower values of p. 
A Jikely drawback to this system is the complexity required of the bonzifier. To achieve decent 
output statistics, we must deal with candidate words in n-length sequences. The value offh(wi, 
wi+I····· wi+n) must be computed by the bonzifier for each candidate sequence "on the fly," since 
computing this value for all possible a-length word sequences in the language database would be 
impractical. Thus, the encoding process will almost undoubtedly be quite slow. It may also be 
quite difficult to implement an appropriate natural language generation engine for this scheme, 
given that the candidate words must be checked in multiword sequences. 
We note that System 4 has the same dependence on the analyzed text domain as System 3. If, for 
example, we attempt to generate poetry bonzotext using a compression function fh(·) created 
based on the statistics of h(W c), where W c is the random word sequence corresponding to 
cooking recipes, the output off h(·) may not be sufficiently uniform. 
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CHAPTER3. SOFrWAREIMPLEMENTATION 
3.1. System Overview 
The experimental bonzo-coding software has undergone several revisions, and it continues to 
evolve as weaknesses are discovered and improvements devised. In its current state, it serves to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the class of text steganographic schemes proposed, and allow for 
continued experimentation. However, neither its security nor its user-friendliness are at an 
acceptable level for distribution at present. 
The "proof of concept" implementation of the bonzo-coding scheme uses the design of System 2. 
The sequence R is implemented as the output of a weak random number generator whose seed er 
is known to sender, recipient and attacker. Thus, we may consider Ra sequence of known 
constants. However, since there are several possible seed values, R is actually one of several 
available constant sequences. 
Figure 3.1 is a block diagram representation of the implemented system, which indicates its 
information flow. The plaintext is encrypted, and the ciphertext decrypted, using the Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) software [2]. Normally, the beginning of a PGP-enhanced file contains several 
recognizable "header" bytes which describe its format (it may be symmetrically encrypted, signed, 
the identifier of the asymmetric key used for signing, etc.). A program called "Stealth" [19] 
removes or restores the header bytes so that we may convert a POP-enhanced file to a file of pure 
ciphertext, and vice-versa. 
The bonzifier requires the sender to specify a "language" file containing the Context-Free 
Grammar information to be used. The sender must also choose the values of the parameters p, p, 
and a. In practice, the sender usually tries a few different sets of these values to find a selection 
that produces an error-free encoding of minimal length for a particular language file. 
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!A 'I' 'I' x 
PGP Stealth Debonzifier 
Figure 3.1. Block diagram of implemented system 
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The values of�. p, and a, as well as the length of the ciphertext Lx, may each be encoded in the 
bonzotext itself or shared between sender and recipient via external channels. In the former case, 
the communicating parties maintain a minimum of shared information, thus making the system 
easier to use. In the latter, the bonzotext has fewer recognizable attributes and is therefore less 
detectable. We can imagine attacks where all text is scanned to see if the decoded output of the 
first few words of likely bonzoblock locations represents typical values of�. p, and O', or if the 
length of the message is what would be expected if it were a bonzo-coding of Lx bytes of 
ciphertext. Although each of these four values may be included in, or exc1uded from, the 
bonzotext independently, we imagine that their inc1usion will be governed by two principal ways 
of using the bonzo-coding software: 
1. "Demo Mode"
The users are not tenibly concerned about maximal indetectability but are more interested 
in experimenting with the coding scheme and sharing bonzotext with a maximal audience. 
In this case, all parameters are encoded in the bonzotext. 
2. "Paranoid Mode"
If the communicating parties are indeed concerned about the system detectability, then 
they will probably exc1ude the parameters from the bonzotext and use external channels 
for sharing them. A reasonable special case of this is for two parties to agree to use the 
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same values of p, p, and cr for all bonzified communications. Then the value ofLx may 
either be included in the encoding (not a large degradation in security) or determined by 
such means as a unique "End-Of-File" symbol at the end of the ciphertext. 
Each of the main steps involved in bonzo-coding is now explained in tum. Note that since Greek 
characters are not easily typed on standard terminals, the variables b, p and s will occasionally be 
used to represent p, p, and a, respectively. 
3.2 PGP Encryption, Decryption 
As PGP is the current de facto standard software package for public-key cryptography, and it is 
available at no cost both within the United States and abroad, it is a natural choice for the 
cryptographic companion of the bonzo-coding software (or vice-versa). We make a few 
observations about how different ways of using PGP impact the performance of the bonzo-coding 
system. 
To encrypt the plaintext data, the sender will either use a symmetric key (a passphrase) shared 
with the recipient, or she will use the recipient's public key. In the latter case, the need for a 
shared passphrase is avoided, as the data may only be decrypted using the recipient's 
�orresponding private key. In either case, the plaintext is compressed by PGP before encryption. 
H:owever, the encryption is performed on a block-by-block basis and additional information may 
',e included in the ciphertext file. All of these have an effect on the resulting size of the ciphertext, 
md thus on the size of the bonzotext required to transmit it. 
fypically, the compression operation is significant for plaintext messages longer than one line. If 
he resulting compressed data are longer than the original plaintext, the compression is bypassed. 
:.or short plaintext files, the length of the ciphertext is more dramatically affected by the choice of 
:ymmetric or asymmetric cryptography. If asymmetric cryptography is used, then the ciphertext 
s longer due to the fact that PGP symmetrically encrypts the plaintext with a random session key 
md precedes the resulting ciphertext with a key exchange block containing the session key 
:ncrypted under the recipient1s public key. The observed results of choosing symmetric versus 
�ymmetric encryption are summarized in Table 3.1. All values in the table are rough 
.pproximations. To minimize the length of the bonzotext, symmetric encryption was used for all 
xperirnents with the implemented bonzo-coding system. 
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Table 3.1. Approximate data length increase for PGP symmetric, asymmetric encryption 
Data Expansion Ratio 
Plaintext Description Plaintext Length Symmetric Asymmetric 
A few words 10 bytes 5 : 1 15 : 1 
A single line 50 bytes 2 : 1 4 : I 
A single paragraph 200 bytes 1.3 : I 1.5: I 
Processing the symmetrically encrypted data with Stealth removes the initial five bytes identifying 
the PGP version number, the format of the file (symmetrically encrypted) and related information. 
The output of Stealth is the ciphertext alone. Before decrypting the received ciphertext with 
PGP, the recipient must use Stealth to restore the information that was removed by the sender. 
Here we assume that the receiver knows a priori the type of encryption applied to the ciphertext, 
which is a reasonable requirement. 
3.3 Bonzotext Structure 
The structure of a bonzotext file used in the implemented system may be summarized as follows, 
using an informal notation similar to BNF. 
• Bonzotext = Prelude, Body, [Ending]
• Prelude= Triggerword followed by a lot own number of lines
• Preamble= [w�J, [wpJ, [w0]
• Lp = number of words in Preamble (Lp is between O and 3)
• Payload= [Lx I] x 1 lx2 1 ... I xLx 
• x1' =first� bits of Payload, x2' =second� bits of Payload, etc.
• w1 = word chosen to encode xj' (i.e., f(wj) = xi')
• Wnc *=a sequence of noncoded words
7v e explain this format while referring to the example bonzotext in Fig. 3.2. The hidden message 
n this instance of bonzotext is "Destroy the tapes!" and it is unencrypted. 
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Dear William: 
I'm 
up with 
sorry I haven't written you 
a name for my grunge band. 
"Gramma Judas .i. the censors" 
"bastard scum" 
"fish" 
"David Mold k � ravenous breasts" 
"heads" 
"gooey toroedoes" 
".till! minstrel cramps" 
"dang sisters" 
"the critter" 
"thirty-seven paperbacks" 
"psychic jalopy" 
"liyg" 
"twirling thirty-six boys" 
".till! wagon" 
"angry king" 
sooner. I've been trying to come 
Here are my best ideas so far: 
Tell me if you have any favorites. 
Adam 
Figure 3.2. Sample bonzotext with �=7, p=2 
The "Triggerword" identifies the beginning of the Prelude, and its default value is the word 
"Dear." The use of a Triggerword aIIows bonzotext to be contained in a file with other text 
preceding it (mail headers, for example); we only require that the Triggerword not be used before 
the Prelude. The Prelude continues for a known number of lines before the Body of the 
bonzotext begins. As a default, the Body starts on the third line after the line containing the 
Triggerword. In Fig. 3.2, the Prelude consists of everything from the word "Dear" until the start 
of the grunge band names. 
The-Body is equivalent to the bonzoblock; it is the section that contains all coded words. The 
first words of the Body are the coded words carrying the values of J3, p and cr, if the sender 
;pecified that these parameters be encoded in the bonzotext. These words constitute the 
'Preamble" and they are always coded with three bits per word. The recipient instructs the 
iebonzifier as to what Preamble words exists in the bonzotext. For example, if the recipient tells 
he debonzifier that f3=2, and that p and cr were encoded in the bonzotext (but not P), then the 
lebonzifier will interpret the Preamble as "w P w 0." Note that even if the padding value p were
:hosen to be nonzero, the coded words of the preamble are never separated by noncoded words. 
n Fig. 3.2, the words "Gramma," "Judas," and "the" correspond to w
i,
, wp, and w0. 
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The data to be coded consist of the ciphertext X, possibly preceded by the byte length of the 
ciphertext Lx. In the implemented system, 12 bits are used to encode Lx. These data are called 
the "Payload" and it is encoded in 13-bit chunks. There may be noncoded words between the 
words carrying the Payload data. In a sense, the word padding is "turned on" after the Preamble. 
In Fig. 3.2, the Payload data are carried by the coded words between "censors" and "king," with 
the underlined words being noncoded words. 
The bonzotext may contain an Ending section, consisting of words not used in the encoding. In 
Fig. 3.2 the Ending is the sign-off. Note that there is nothing to prevent the Prelude, Body, and 
Ending sections to be seemlessly int_egrated. Depending on the definition of the language file used 
by the bonzifier, the bonzotext may switch in midsentence from Prelude to Body, or Body to 
Ending. 
3.4 Debonzifier Operation 
The source code for the debonzifier, written in C, is given in Section A.3. It is a very simple 
program which can be easily made to run on any operating system platform of interest. The most 
complicated aspect of this program is that it implements its own pseudo-random number 
generator, since the R sequence must be the same as that generated by the bonzifier. A linear 
feedback shift register (LFSR) is used to generate this sequence. It is seeded by one of eight 
constants, as chosen by the value of a. 
The sequence R is simply the lower b bits of the LFSR output. To determine which words of the 
Payload section are coded words, the debonzifier maps the lower three bits of the LFSR output to 
a binary value. This is done using a lookup table which is constructed using the value of p. The 
table contains p zeros and (8-p) ones. So when a uniform random variable is used as the index to 
the table, the table value will be zero (i.e., a non-coded word) with probability p/8. Thus, we will 
expect p/8 noncoded words for each coded word. 
fhe steps taken by the debonzifier may be described as follows: 
I. Accept any command-line arguments for p, p, a, or Lx. If supplied, then assume these
parameters will not be encoded in the Body.
2. Look for the first occurrence of the Triggenvord in the input file. If not found, abort.
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3. Find the start of the Body section by skipping the appropriate number lines after the
Triggerword.
4. Using a bits-per-word value of 3, decode any Preamble words expected.
5. With word padding enabled and using � bits per word,
5a. Decode enough words of the Payload to detennine Lx (if it was not given as a
command-line argument).
Sb. Decode enough words to output Lx bytes.
Note that the decoding performed in steps 5a and Sb follows the algorithm specified in Fig. 2.3, 
page 27. 
3.5 Language File Specification 
The language files specify the Context-Free Grammar to be used by the bonzifier. The language 
file given in Section B was used to create the example bonzotext shown in Fig. 3.2, page 38. We 
now briefly describe the syntax of the language files. 
A production rule is defined by the "->" symbol. Alternatives for a particular rule are specified 
either by placing them on subsequent lines (before the next rule definition containing a "-> "), or 
by separating strings on the same line with a "l" symbol. A single alternative may span multiple 
lines by ending the nonterminal lines with an underscore symbol. Probability weightings for 
production rule alternatives can be specified by including an integer in square brackets. For 
example, if a particular alternative contains "[2]," then it will be twice as likely to be chosen as 
alternatives with no probability weightings. 
A terminal string is enclosed in double quotes. If the double-quote character is itself to be used in 
a terminal string, it appears twice in a row (note that we do not allow zero-length terminal 
strings). 
The name of a production rule is essentially arbitrary, though it must not contain spaces. There 
are a few reserved names that must be defined in the language file. These names are Prelude, 
Body, Ending, and "ConsoleEcho." The meanings of the first three are obvious. The 
ConsoleEcho rule is a list which tells the bonzifier when it should display the output of a 
�ompleted rule. For instance, the sender may wish to see each line of poetry as it is constructed, 
:ather than wait for the entire output flle to be completed before viewing it. 
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The pound symbol "#" at the beginning of a name has a special meaning. This tells the bonzifier 
to repeatedly evaluate the designated production rule until all of the data are encoded. Note that 
if the bonzifier runs out of data to encode midway through the e:valuation of a particular 
production rule, it finishes evaluating the rule. 
3.6 Bonzifier Operation 
The source code implementing the bonzifier, written in language PowerBasic (for PC 
compatibles), is given in Section A.4. While the bonzifier source code is rather elaborate, its 
function is conceptual1y simple. It recursively searches through· the production rules of the CFG 
to find a sequence of words which has the proper code values, using a variation of a depth-first 
search algorithm. Most of its complexity resides in its "MakeThjng" subroutine, which is called 
recursively to evaluate production rules. When Make Thing finds a terminal string while 
evaluating the Body, it checks if the corresponding code values match the desired results (the bits 
of the Body) for the current word position in question. 
The bonzifier implements the same LFSR and e( ·) function as the debonzifier; however, these 
numbers may be pre-computed. In other words, the positions o( all coded words with respect to 
the beginning of the Body section are determined before the search begins. 
The main steps performed by the bonzifier are as follows: 
I. Load the input file data into an array. Insert �. p, O', and Lx at the beginning of this array,
if they are to be encoded.
2. Load the information from the language file into a series of string arrays (unparsed).
3. Process the language information by parsing the production rules and pre-computing h( w)
for all words in all terminal strings.
4. Make the Prelude (with encoding turned off).
5. Make the Body (with encoding turned on).
6. Make the Ending (with encoding turned off).
When MakeThing evaluates a production rule with encoding turned off, i t  makes random choices 
whenever alternatives are available. 
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The search algorithm implemented by MakeThing works as follows. First note that in addition to 
returning a string representing the fully evaluated production rule, MakeThing also returns the 
number of coding errors associated with this evaluation. When evaluating a particular production 
rule for possible inclusion in the bonzoblock, MakeThing first picks a random alternative and 
begins to evaluate a11 of the rules it contains. If one of these rules is a tenninal string, its coding 
errors may be calculated directly. If the rule is nontenninal, it must make a recursive call to 
evaluate that rule. Once MakeThing encounters errors while expanding and evaluating a 
particular alternative, it attempts to switch to another alternative. If expanding the new 
alternative begins to accumulate more errors than the previous alternative, it tries to find another 
alternative. If none exists, it goes back to expanding the alternative that accumulates the fewest 
number of errors. It continues this until a full evaluation is complete. 
The evaluation returned by MakeThing is necessarily one with the fewest possible errors for that 
rule. This is a consequence of the strategy of continuing to expand the alternative with the fewest 
errors, switching alternatives whenever the one it is expanding gains more errors than another. In 
practice, we are only interested in error-free encodings, so the search may be expediated by 
discarding an alternative as soon as it is found to yield a single error. For purposes of 
experimentation, the implemented algorithm continues to consider such alternatives so that it may 
find a complete evaluation with the fewest errors even when an error-free evaluation is not 
achievable. It is important to note that the evaluation returned is not the only possible evaluation 
achieving the minimum number of errors. In this sense, the logic of MakeThing implements a 
"greedy algorithm"; it goes with the first optimal evaluation it finds. 
The greedy strategy here implies that the bonzifier will not consider all possible alternatives for 
evaluating a rule. For example, let's say that the language file defines the "Body" rule as 
Body -> Greeting Apology Excuses #Whats-up 
and MakeThing produces an error-free evaluation of Greeting that is 15 words in length. It will 
then continue and attempt to find an error-free evaluation of Apology. It is possible that a ten­
word Greeting would make an error-free Apology possible, whereas a 15-word Greeting 
positions the coded words such that all possible expansions of Apology produce errors. As 
currently implemented, MakeThing will never "back up" and re-evaluate a rule for which it 
already achieved a minimal evaluation. In this sense, it is a fairly naive search mechanism. 
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CHAPTER4. RESULTS 
4.1 Bonzotext Suitability 
How do we measure the qualitative effectiveness of text-based steganographic systems? A truly 
successful bonzo-coding scheme might, for example, be able to create a Master's thesis that 
encoded a secret recipe for key lime pie, the plaintext being only available to the holders of a 
particular decryption key. The author refuses to admit whether or not this document is such an 
example. However, it is true that a number of messages generated using the fairly unsophisticated 
coding system described in Chapter 3 have been included in private communications and mailing 
list postings without their computer-generated nature being detected. More work will be needed 
to overcome Lincoln's Lemma4 and achieve consistent indetectability. 
It was found that the key to making the bonzotext unnoticeably different from humantext lies in 
the choice of domain of humantext writing used for the bonzotext generation. In a domain ideally 
suited for bonzo�coding, the human conventions governing what text is acceptable are either 
trivially concise (and thus easily implemented as a CFG) or extremely subjective and flexible (as 
with certain fonns of poetry). There appear to be many "small" domains of writing that fulfill 
these criteria; examples include modem poetry, grocery lists, and names of grunge bands. As a 
result of experimentation to date, we assert that the generation of realistic bonzotext in such 
domains is far easier than attempting to produce more complex writing structures, such as 
complete letters. 
[n practice, it was determined that the embedding of bonzotext within humantext messages can 
give results that are rather inconspicuous. The casual eavesdroppers, modeled by mailing list 
:,bservers in some experiments, tend to skim the contents of a message once the initial text leads 
:hem to believe that there is nothing unusual ( or interesting) contained in the document. Thus, it 
s considered a strength of the bonzo-coding schemes presented here that the bonzotext may be 
�mbedded within humantext somewhat seemlessly. 
n addition to the bonzotext shown in Fig. 3.2, three more examples of bonzotext are given in 
)ections C.1, C.2 and C.3. Although the CFGs for each of these examples are structurally simple 
md were constructed in a fairly haphazard manner, the bonzotext approaches a level of realism 
"You can foo1 some of the people all of the time ... ," Abraham Lincoln, 1858 [20]. 
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sufficient to fool the casual human observer. The recipe example in Section C.3 suggests that the 
context-free nature of the natural language generation system used will limit the level of realism 
achievable by this system (i.e., the choice of ingredients do not match the ingredients used in the 
preparation instructions). However, the complaint letter example in Section C.1 indicates that 
with the proper definition of the language file, some context may be established and kept 
consistent (in this case, the name of the target of the complaint). 
4.2 Typical Expansion Ratios 
The usable values of p and p varied with the choice of the language file. For CFGs consisting of 
simple lists with many alternatives available for its components, error-free encodings were 
obtained using P=6 or P=7 coupled with p=O or p=l. This yielded an expansion ratio of roughly 
20 bytes of bonzotext for every byte of ciphertext. Since the use of encryption for short me.ssages 
accounted for an approximate 2: I expansion, the overall expansion ratio was roughly 40:1. This 
means that for one line of plaintext, we would typically obtain a short page worth of bonzotext. 
Other CFGs, such as those used to generate the complaint letter and poetry examples in Sections 
C.l and C.2, contained longer fragments of human-generated text as string literals. The
achievable values of p in these cases were found to be much lower (between I and 3), with the
higher values of p requiring p values greater than one. Thus, the bonzotext is roughly 40 times
longer than the ciphertext, and the overall expansion ratio is in the neighborhood of 80: 1. As the
poetry example in Section C.2 demonstrates, we can therefore get a full page of bonzotext for
:mly a few words of plaintext.
[n general, the word padding feature was found to be quite useful. In a previous version of the 
Jonzifier, this option was not available and it was often difficult to obtain bonzotext that was both 
�rror-free and reasonably sized. Typically, the bonzifier could not find an error free encoding for 
me value of P, but the error-free bonzotext generated using the next lower value of p was 
mnecessarily long. Allowing for non-coded words in the bonzotext provides a greater continuum 
n parameter space, which improves the overall quality of the bonzifier output. 
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4.3 Time Efficiency 
The debonzifier was observed to require negligible execution time for the short messages 
considered here. Since the debonzification time was clearly less than one half of a second on all 
hardware platfonns considered, the actual time was not measured in the experiments on the 
implemented system. 
The time required by the bonzifier to produce an error-free encoding also varied substantially with 
the choice of language files. Simple CFGs, with relatively few produption rules and literal strings, 
would typically lead to bonzification times under three seconds whetj run on a 486-based, 
50 MHz PC system. CFGs with more alternatives (such as the poetTt language) would require up 
to five minutes to complete a bonzotext. Overall, bonzification timeJ between 10 seconds and 
one minute were mostly frequently encountered. 
The above are only measurements of the time required to produce a single instance of bonzotext. 
To find the appropriate p and p values for a particular language file, anywhere between three and 
ten trials were required. This process would only have to be done once for a particular language 
file (after which, several messages may be sent using it), and the steps involved are simple enough 
that this optimization could be automated. Once the appropriate p and p values were found, 
several trials were also needed tb produce an optimally realistic bonzotext for a particular 
message. This step required roughly between three and five bonzifications. This per-message 
filtering could be omitted if the language file is known to regularly produce acceptable bonzotext. 
The most time-consuming step of using the bonzifier, as implemented, was that of preparing a few 
useful language files. Some of them were constructed "from scratch"; this is a laborious yet 
educational process which could not be expected of every sender wishing to use the bonzo-coding 
system. However, the proliferation of natural language generation engines on the Internet has 
made feasible the task of modifying an already functional system so that it works with or as the 
bonzifier. For exampJe, using the source code from Pakin's "Complaint Generator," [21], [22] a 
[;Orresponding language file was constructed within a couple of hours. The adaptation process 
mainly consisted of a series of string search-and-replace operations. This experience leads us to 
the assertion that any number of natural language generators available today could be modified to 
.vork in the bonzo-coding scheme without much difficulty. 
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4.4 Statistical Characteristics 
The problem facing anyone designing a cryptographic system for practical use is that it is 
impossible to prove that the system is impervious to all forms of analysis and attack (the one-time 
pad is the only exception). Furthermore, it is impossible to anticipate all attacks that could be 
used against the system. The best that can be done is to try as many attack strategies as possible 
and see if any succeed. Similarly, we cannot truly show that a bonzo-coding system or its 
implementation can provide indetectability against all forms of analysis that an eavesdropper 
might employ. Thus, we perform a few simple tests using standard statistical methods now and 
apply more "torture testing" to the system as its development continues. 
For the purposes of obtaining initial measurements of the suitability ·of the implemented system, 
two types of statistical tests were petformed. Both are measurements based on the one­
dimensional frequency distribution of the sequences in question. That is, we model the sequence 
as samples of a random variable and estimate the one-dimensional probability distribution of that 
random variable using the relative frequency of each of its output values. 
The statistical tests were performed using five sequences defined as follows: 
• "random" is a sequence of random numbers from the system "rand(·)" function
• "ciphertext" is a sequence of data symmetrically encrypted using PGP and Stealth
• "debonzo(humantext)" is the output of the implemented debonzifier when given
humantext samples as input
• "hash_only(humantext)" is the output of h(·) when given humantext samples
• "huff man" is the huffman encoding of the humantext samples
[he "random" and "huffman" sequences were included mainly for reference. The primary 
nterests are the similarities and differences between the other three sequences. 
:;or each sequence, five measurements were taken at each of four different sequence lengths. The 
.equence lengths correspond to typical lengths ofbonzotext messages, and each measurement is 
aken using a different set of humantext files as input. The humantext was chosen from online 
1ewspapers as well as personal correspondence. 
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4.4.1 Entropy test 
The entropy of a random variable can be thought of a measure of its randomness or infonnation 
content. It is computed as the sum of p,.·Iog2(llpx) for all probabilities Px· A uniformly 
distributed random variable has the highest entropy possible. Figure 4.1 is a plot of the entropy 
measurements for our sequences of interest. Note the sequences are 8-bit values, and the entropy 
of an ideal, uniform random variable with 256 possible values is also eight bits. 
Intuitively, we expect the "random" sequence to have the highest entropy, and indeed this is 
confirmed in measurements. The ciphertext should also have statistics similar to a random 
sequence, which .is also observed in the tests. The fact that each of these sequences has an 
entropy somewhat less than eight bits is mainly due to the small length of the sequence; that is, 
nonuniformities develop in the distribution merely because there are not enough samples. The 
entropy approaches eight bits as the sequence length increases. 
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There are a few interesting observations to be made from Fig. 4.1. First, the hash_only output has 
a significantly lower entropy than the ciphertext, so much so that distinguishing between h(WH)
and h(W B) is likely to be fairly reliable based on the entropy statistic. However, the output of the 
debonzifier in the implementation is f(W) = h(W) EB R. Since the implemented system uses 
constant sequences for R that are somewhat crude samples of a white noise random sequence, the 
debonzifier output can be considered a rough approximation of f(W) using a strong PRNG for R. 
In Fig. 4.1, the debonzifier output for humantext, f(WH), displays an entropy which is quite 
comparable to that of the ciphertext and also the "random" sequences. The low entropy of the 
Huffman-encoded humantext is probably due to the algorithm chosen for assigning ones and zeros 
to the branches of the Huffman tree. For example, if the branch corresponding to the node with 
the higher probability is always assigned a one, then ones will occur more frequently in the output 
of the Huffman encoder. 
4.4.2 Chi-squared test 
The Chi-squared test is a tool commonly used in statistical analyses to see how closely the 
measured distribution of one random variable matches that of another. Here we are mainly 
interested in how similar the distributions of hash_only(humantext) and debonzo(humantext) are 
to that of ciphertext. However, since we do not have a suitable theoretical model of the 
distribution of ciphertext (other than that of white noise), we may accomplish this by comparing 
the measured distributions of all five sequences to what would be expected from an ideal, unifonn 
random variable. This is exactly the experiment described by Knuth [23] in measuring the 
"randomness" of a particular pseudo-random number generator. 
Figure 4.2 shows the measured Chi-squared statistics using the byte-valued output of each of the 
sequences. Thus, the ideal random variable in question has 256 equally likely values. The Chi­
squared statistic that compares two 256-valued variables is said to have 255 degrees of freedom. 
There are statistical tables which indicate how likely a particular value of the Chi-squared statistic 
is for an ideal random variable with the specified degrees of freedom. For example, a Chi-squared 
statistic calculated for an ideal, unifonn random variable with 255 degrees of freedom is known to 
be greater than 252, 75% of the time, and greater than 286, 25% of the time. If the measured 
Chi-squared statistic for a random variable under test is within roughly the 15% to 85% range, 
:hen it is considered to match the distribution of the ideal random variable fairly well. 
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n Fig. 4.2, we see again that the "random" and "ciphertext" sequences display behavior quite 
imilar to the ideal uniform random variable. In addition, the debonzifier output (with hurnantext 
s input) is also in the same range, which is another indication that f(WH) is difficult to distinguish
rom ciphertext for System 2. Note however that the hash_only output is very different from 
iphertext by this measure. Thus, the System 1 output h(WH) will be easily discerned when 
om pared with h(W 8), the ciphertext.
'inally, we may also measure the Chi-squared statistic using the frequency of bit values in each 
�quence, as opposed to the byte values. Thus, we are comparing the measured distributions of 
1ese sequences with what we expect from a binary, uniformly distributed random variable, i.e., a 
lir coin toss. This involves measuring the Chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom. 
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Figure 4.3 displays the results of this "bit frequency" Chi-squared test. Note that the vertica1 axis 
1ses a logarithmic scale. Here again we see that the random and ciphertext sequences have fairly 
deal statistics, and the debonzifier output is comparable though less well-matched than in 
,revious tests. The observed imbalance of one and zero values in the Huffman-encoded data 
,upports the assertion that the branches of the Huffman tree are not assigned code values in a 
:ufficient1y random fashion. 
�aturally there are many other statistical tests that should be performed on such a system before a 
1seful assessment of its security is at hand. Interestingly enough, several of the tests used in 
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cryptanalysis to detennine if a candidate decryption is successful are also applicable to this task. 
The cryptanalyst also desires to quickly tell the difference between ciphertext (the output of a 
decryption with the wrong key) and non-random, possibly human-generated data (the correct 
decryption). Tests such as the Index of Coincidence and the variations on Sinkov's Statistic, 
described in [24] and [25], would be worth performing in the context of the bonzo-coding system. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Conclusions 
From both of the analyses in Chapter 2 and the experience gained implementing the "proof-of­
concept" system, it is our conclusion that the class of bonzo-coding schemes proposed show 
promise in providing a means for practica1 text steganography. The implemented system offers a 
convincing argument that such systems are feasible, though there is much work to be done before 
a bonzo-coding software package will be deployable and usable on a widespread basis. 
It is notable that the bonzo-coding systems presented here allow error-free recovery of the 
ciphertext from the bonzotext with a minimum of shared information maintained between sender 
and recipient. This is possible because the statistics of f(W) are made to be independent of the 
statistics of W. The main theoretical question left unanswered is how to make a bonzifier that 
ensures that the desired a-dimensional word distribution is achieved in the bonzotext. This could 
be accomplished by selecti.ng candidate a-length word sequences (or longer) and base the decision 
to include them in the bonzotext on both the code values achieved and the desired distribution 
[16]. We may also envision schemes that preprocess larger word sequences so that all candidates 
are drawn from a data set known to have the desired distribution. 
In addition to the theoretical analyses of the detectability of the bonzo-coding systems, it is 
important to consider the humantext domain of the bonzotext. Practically speaking, we need not 
require that the bonzifier be able to generate perfect dissertations; if it can produce simple 
messages such as shopping lists, Jove poems, or dream descriptions, then we can still consider the 
system usable. Furthermore, it is important to note that if the bandwidth requirements are low, 
then the bonzotext can be made quite realistic by the use oflow values of� and high values of p. 
The example shown in Fig. 3.2 demonstrates that frequent words such as "the" are easily included 
in the bonzotext if noncoded words are allowed. We conjecture that for a reasonably designed 
language file, increased word padding will make the word distribution of the bonzotext more 
accurately match that of the relevant humantext. 
5.2 Future Work 
fhis research is likely to be continued by exploring multiple paths concurrently. To allow more 
.nterested parties to experiment with bonzo-coding, we seek to translate the bonzifier source code 
nto portable C so that it may be used on any operating system platform desired. This will also 
1ave the effect of increasing the computational efficiency of the bonzifier, since programs 
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compiled using PowerBasic are almost invariably slower than those compiled in C. Expanding the 
user base of the bonzo-coding software will make the necessary improvements in the system 
design more evident. Already much has been learned by collaborators attempting to write 
language files and use the bonzo-coding system. 
The next step for continuing the development of the implemented system is to include support for 
a cryptographically strong PRNG, so that the system's statistical properties are improved. There 
are a number ofmiscel1aneous enhancements that can also be made. For instance, there should be 
ways of identifying the location of a bonzoblock other than looking for a particular Triggerword. 
On a different path, it is considered worthwhile to attempt the implementation of System 3 and/or 
System 4. It is possible that the use of mimic functions, as specified in these designs, will greatly 
increase the observable statistics of the bonzo-coding system. We may also see an improvement 
in performance since the bonzifier may be able to find error-free encodings more easily for these 
systems. 
Further statistical analyses are warranted, for the implemented system as well as any future 
implementations of Systems 3 or 4. This is another area that would benefit greatly from the 
involvement of others, particularly those experienced in statistical analysis of ciphertext and 
related matters. 
Perhaps the most important area of future investigation is that of improving the natural language 
generation engine of the bonzifier. Given the quality and abundance of current research in the 
rreas of Natural Language Generation and Natural Language Understanding, we consider it quite 
,ossible that the task of constructing a language file used in the bonzification process may be 
mtomated. It is easy to imagine a program which runs in the background, scans the abundance of 
mman-generated text available on the Internet, and gathers linguistic structures to be used for 
,ouzo-coding; In this way, language files might be continually created and discarded after being 
1sed once by the bonzifier. 
rhis model of automated language file modification has been the vision from the start of the 
,onzo-coding work. It is undesirable to have either a static set of language files used by all 
.enders, or to require senders to hand-edit the language files. We must, however, always allow 
he sender to specify their language to a fine degree. Indeed, the educational process involved in 
earning to abstract and regenerate human textual communication is perhaps as valuable as any 
.dditional privacy provided by the steganographic system. 
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APPENDIX A. PROGRAM LISTINGS 
The source code for several of the text steganographic systems discussed in this thesis are given in 
Sections A. l through A.4. The smooch-coding scheme described in Section 1.3.1.3 uses the 
"ENSMOOCH'' encoder, whose source code is given in Section A.1, and the "DESMOOCH" 
decoder, whose source code is given in Section A.2. Section A.3 contains the source code for the 
debonzifier discussed in Section 3.4. Section A.4 briefly describes some distinctive features of the 
PowerBasic language, and lists the source code for the bonzifier discussed in Section 3.6. 
A.I ENSMOOCH.C 
/• s, 1-4 [2 bits]
M, 1-4 [2 bits]
o, 2-10 [3 bits] 
CH 
! : 0-3 [2 bits] 
•1
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <ctype.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#define OUTBITS 7 
#define LENWORDS 1 
ide£ine BADWORD -1
/* nwnber of words for bi tlength * I
FILE 
char 
int 
int 
int 
*infile,*dummyfile;
*word,durnrnystring[128Jr
i ,j ,k,wordbits;
inbuf[lOOOO], inbufptr,
INandmask, OUTandmask;
buflen, totalbits = O; 
/********************************************************************/ 
int load_infile(void) 
[ 
int shiftreg = 0, cbits = O; 
char c; 
inbufptr = LENWORDS; 
while ((c = fgetc(infile)) != EOF) { 
shiftreg I= (c & OUTandmask); 
cbits += OUTBITS; 
if (cbits >= wordbits) { 
inbuf[inbufptr++] = {shiftreg >> (cbits - wordbits)) & INandmask; 
shiftreg &= ((1 << (cbits - wordbits)l - l); 
chits -= wordbits; 
totalbits += wordbits; 
} 
shiftreg = shiftreg << OUTBITS; 
} 
buflen = inbufptr; 
/* a wordbits-bit nwnber */ 
inbuf{O] = totalbits I wordbits - l; /* number of words to decode */ 
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/********************************************************************! 
char *encode_word{wordnum) 
( 
l 
int wordnum; 
int i, n, s = O; 
char tmpsmooch[32]; 
n = ((wordnum >> 7) & 3) + 1;
for (i = O; i < n; i++l 
tmpsmooch[s++] = •S'; 
n -=. ( (wordnum >> 5) & 3) + l;
for (i = O; i < n; i++)
tmpsmooch[s++] = 'M'; 
n = ( (wordnum >> 2) & 7) + 2; 
for (i = O; i < n; i++)
tmpsmooch[s++J = '0'; 
tmpsmooch[s++J = 'C'; 
tmpsmooch[s++] = 'H'; 
n -: wordnum & 3; 
for {i = O; i < n; i++) 
tmpsmooch[s++l = '! '; 
tmpsrnooch[s++] = '\0'; 
print£ ( "%s " , tmpsmo�ch) ; 
return tmpsmooch; 
/********************************************************************/ 
main ( argc, argvJ
char* argv[]; 
int argc; 
( 
int wordnum, nbits = O; 
if (argc < 3) { 
puts("USAGE: ensmooch infile dununyfile"); 
ex.it{-1); 
) 
wordbits -: 9;
INandmask = (1 << wordbits) - 1; 
OUTandmask = (1 << OUTBITS) - 1; 
if (f(infile = fopen(argv[lL"rt"))) { 
printf("Can't open input file: %s\n",argv[l]); 
exit (-1); 
l 
if (!{dununyfile = fopen{argv[2],"rt"))) { 
printf{"Can't open dununy file: %s\n",argv[2]); 
exit(-1); 
l 
load_infile(}; 
fclose(infile); 
puts ( ""); 
inbufptr = 0; 
while (fgets{dummystring,128,dummyfile)) 
word= strtok(dummystring," "); 
while (word) { 
l.f (strncmp(word,"<>",2) == OJ 
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) 
) 
) 
if {inbufptr < buflen) 
encode_word{inbuf[inbufptr++]); 
else 
encode_word(O); 
if (strstr{word,"\n"J != NULL) 
puts("#); 
) 
else { 
if (word[OJ == 32) 
word++; 
printf ( "%s ", word) ; 
) 
word = strtok(NULL," "); 
) 
fclose(dununyfile); 
puts(�"); 
/********************************************************************! 
A.2 DESMOOCH.C 
,. s, 1-4 [2 bits] 
M, 1-4 [2 bits] 
o, 2-10 [3 bits] 
CH 
! : 0-3 [2 bits] ., 
ltinclude <stdio.h> 
ltinclude <stdlib.h> 
�include <ctype.h> 
Jinclude <string.h> 
�define DEFAULTWORDEITS 
tdefine OUTEITS 7 
fdefine LENWORDS 1 
fdefine BADWORD -1 
�ILE 
:har 
.nt 
9 
/* number of words for bitlength * I
*infile;
word[128],dummystring[128]; 
i,j,k,wordbits,nbits = O; 
'********************************************************************! 
.nt decode_word (word) 
char* word; 
int length, i, ok = 0, c, ret = O; 
length = strlen(word); 
for (i=O; i<length; i++) 
word[i] = toupper{word[i]); 
if ( (strstr (word, "SM�) 
return BADWORD; 
) 
== NULL) 11 (strstr(word, "OOCH") 
i = strchr(word,'M') - strchr(word,'S'); 
ret = (i-1) << 7; 
i = strchr(word, '0') - st:rchr(word, 'M'); 
ret += (i-1) << 5; 
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NULL)) ( 
) 
i = strchr(word, 'C') - strchr(word, 'O'); 
ret += (i-2) << 2;
if (strchr{word,' ! ') J 
i = strchr(word, '\0') - strchr(word, '! '); 
else 
i = O; 
ret += i; 
return ret; 
/********************************************************************} 
main (argc, argv} 
( 
char* argv [ J; 
int argc; 
int shiftreg = O, totalbits = 0, cbits = 0, wordnum, outch; 
:i,nt INandmask, OUTandrnask; 
if (argc < 2) { 
puts ( "USAGE! desmooch smoochfile" J; 
exit {-1); 
) 
wordbits = 
INandmask 
OUTandmask 
DEFAULTWORDBITS; 
= (l << wordbits) - l; 
= (l << OUTBITS) - l; 
if (! (infile = fopen(argv[l],"rt"))) { 
printf("Can't open input file: %s\n�,argv[l]); 
exit(-1); 
) 
puts {""); 
for (i = O; i < LENWORDS; ) f 
fscanf (infile, "%s", word) ; 
) 
if ((wordnum = decode_word(word)J != BADWDRD) ( 
nbits = wordnum * word.bits; 
i++; 
) 
while ((fscanf(infile,"%s",word) != EDF) && {totalbits <= nbits)) 
if (iwordnum = decode_word(word)) != BADWORD} 
shiftreg I= (wordnurn & INandmask); 
cbits += word.bits; 
while (cbits >= OUTBITS} { 
outch = (shiftreg >> (cbits 
shiftreg &= ((1 << (cbits 
cbits -= OUTBITS; 
putc(outch,stdout); 
totalbits += OUTBITS; 
) 
- OUT BITS J }
OUTBITS)} -
shiftreg = shiftreg << word.bits; 
) 
£close (infile); 
puts(""); 
& OUTandmask; 
1}; 
'********************************************************************/ 
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A.3 DEBONZO.C
/* USAGE: "debonzo bonzofile [options] • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
options: 
-debug
-o outputfile
options used in paranoid mode: (used also during encoding) • 
• • 
• 
• 
-xlen length of plaint ext is n bytes 
-b n use wordbits=n 
-p n use padding=p 
-s n use n as• 
•; 
-b n bonzotext 
#define DOS 
#ifdef DOS 
#define STRICMP stricmp 
#define STRNICMP strnicmp 
#else /* Unix */ 
#define STRICMP strcasecmp 
#define STRNICMP strncasecmp 
#endif 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <ctype.h> 
#include <string.h> 
2 
random 
begins 
seq generator seed 
on n-th line after trigger word 
#define DEFAULTWDRDBITS 
#define OUTBITS 8 
#define LENBITS 12 
#define BADWORD -1 
/* num bits used to code bytelength of payload */ 
char 
int 
*triggerword = QDear";
beginsentence = 3; /* begin decoding this many lines after trigger 
PILE *infile, *outfile; 
:bar word[l28], dummystring[l28J; 
Lnt i, j, k, wordbits = 0, debug = 0, outf = O; 
Lnt xb = O, xpad = O, xseed = O, xlen = O; 
1nsigned int nbytes, padding = O, seed = O, wordnum = O; 
1nsigned int LFSRval, LFSRtab[BJ; 
'***********************************************************************/ 
lnt decode_word(word) 
char* word; 
int length, ok = 0, c, ret = O; 
length = strlen(word); 
for (i=O; i<length; i++) { 
c = word[i]; 
if ( (ok == OJ && (islower(c)) 
c = toupper(c); 
c -= 65; 
if ( ((c >= 0) && (c < 26)) 11 ((c >= 32) && (c < 58))) { 
ok = -1; 
ret += c; 
) 
) 
return ok? ret BADWORD; 
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•; 
!***********************************************************************! 
void Ini tLFSR () 
( 
) 
int i; 
/* 
* make the table mapping 8-bit uniform rv's to a binary rv with prob.
* of outputing a O given by padding I 8 (for padding = 0 to 7)
*I
for {i = 0; i < 8; LFSRtab(i++l = 1) ; 
for (i = O; i < padding; LFSRtab[i++] = 0) 
/* put initial value in shift register use seed, if supplied */ 
LFSRval = Ox9734; /* &b1001 0111 0011 0100 */ 
if ({seed> 0) && (seed!= LFSRvalJ} 
LFSRval = LFSRval A seed; 
/***********************************************************************/ 
unsigned int LFSRGetBit() 
( 
) 
unsigned int i,v,bl,b2,b3; 
for ( i = 0; i < 3; i++) ( I* cycle shift reg 3 times to get 3-bit val */ 
) 
!* new input to LFSR = bl4 XOR b9 XOR b3 */ 
bl = (LFSRval >> ·14) & l; 
b2 = {LFSRval >> 9) & 1; 
b3 = (LFSRval >> 3) & l; 
V = bl A b2 A b3; 
LFSRval = (LFSRval << 1) I v; 
v = LFSRval & 7; I* take lower 3 bits of shift reg output */ 
return LFSRtab[v]; /* map 3 bits to binary r.v value */ 
/***********************************************************************/ 
void get_args(argc,argv) 
( 
char* argv[]; 
int argc; 
if (argc < 2) { 
) 
puts ( "USAGE: debonzo bonzofile [options} [-o outputfileJ "); 
exit(-1); 
for (i = l; i < argc; i++) { 
if (STRICMP{argv[i],"-b") == 0) { 
wordbits = atoi(argv[++i]); 
if ( (wordbits < 1) 11 {wordbits > 8)) { 
wordbits = DEFAULTWORDBITS; 
) 
printf{ "Weird wordbits value. Wordbits = %d assumed\n", 
wordbits); 
xb = 1;
) else if (STRICMP{argv[i],"-p") == OJ 
padding= atoi(argv[++i]); 
if ( (padding < 0) 11 {padding > 7)) { 
padding = O; 
) 
printf("Weird padding value. padding = 0 assumed\n"); 
xpad = l; 
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) 
) 
} else if {STRICMP(argv[iJ ,"-s"} -- O) 
seed = atoi(argv[++i]); 
xseed = 1; 
} else if (STRICMP(argv[iJ, "-xlen") == 0) { 
i++; 
nbytes = atoi(argv[i]); 
xlen = l; 
} else if (STRICMP(argv[il, "-o"l == 0) 
outf = l; 
if {!(outfile = fopen(argv[++i],"wb"))} { 
printf("Can't open output file: %s\n•,argv(iJ); 
exit(-1); 
) 
) else if (STRICMP(argv[i], "-begin") == OJ ( 
i++; 
beginsentence = atoi (argv[i]); 
) else if {STRICMP(argv[i],"-debug") == OJ 
debug = 1,
} else { 
) 
if (!(infile = fopen(argv[il,"rt")l) 
print,f{"Can't open input file: %s\n",argv[i]); 
exit(-1); 
) 
if ( ! infile) { 
J 
puts ( "\nNo input file specified! \n") ; 
puts(•USAGE: debonzo bonzofile [options) [-o outputfile] "); 
exit(-1); 
/***********************************************************************/ 
nain(argc,argv) 
char* a.rgv [ J ; 
int argc; 
inti, done, bytesdone = 0, cbits = 0, wordcode, outch, bitsdone = O; 
int INandma:sk, OUTandrnask = (1 << OUT.BITS) - 1; 
unsigned long shiftreg = O; 
get_args(argc,argv); 
fprintf(stderr,n\n"); 
while ((fscanf(infile,"%s",word) != EOF) && 
{STRNICMP(word,triggerword,strlen(triggerword)) != 0)) 
if (feof(infile)) { 
) 
print£( "Couldn't find trigger word: %s\n", triggerword); 
exit(-1); 
for (i = O; i <= beginsentence; fgets(dununystring,80,infile), i++) 
if (feof(infile)) { 
print£ ( "No bonzotext found %d lines after line with 'Dear' \n", 
beginsentence); 
exit(-1); 
) 
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if (!xb) { 
) 
for (done = O; !done; ) { 
fscanf(infile,"ts�,word); 
) 
if ((wordcode = decode_word(word)) != BADWORD) { 
word.bits = wordcode & 7; 
) 
if (wordbits == 0) { 
wordbits = DEFAULTWORDBITS; 
fprintf {stderr, "Weird word.bits. Wordbits = %d assurned\n", wordbits) ; 
done++; 
if ( lxpad) { 
) 
for (done = O; !done; ) { 
fscanf (infile, "%s", word) ; 
if ((wordcode = decode_word(word)) != BADWORD) ( 
padding = wordcode & 7; 
done++; 
) 
if ( !xseed) { 
for {done = O; !done; ) { 
fscanf (infile, "%s", word) ; 
if ((wordcode = decode_word(word)) != BADWORD) { 
seed= wordcode & 7; 
done++; 
) 
) 
if {debug) 
fprintf {stderr, "wordbits=%d, padding=%d, seed=%d", word.bi ts ,padding, seed) ; 
/* and now the body begins */ 
Ini tLFSR () ; 
INandmask = (l << word.bits) - l; 
if { !xlenJ { /* find numbytes */ 
) 
while (cbits < LENBITS) { 
fscanf (infile, "%s", word) ; 
if {(wordcode = decode_word(word)) != BADWORD) 
if (LFSRGetBit()) { 
wordcode �= LFSRval; 
shiftreg = (shiftreg << word.bits) I (wordcode & INandmask); 
cbits += word.bits; 
word.num++; 
) 
) 
nbytes = shiftreg >> (cbits - LENBITS); 
shiftreg &= (1 << (cbits - LENBITS)) - l; 
shiftreg = shiftreg << word.bits; 
cbits -= LENBITS; 
/* mask out upper LENBITS */ 
if (debug) 
fprintf(stderr," nbytes = %d\n\n",nbytes); 
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while ((fscanf(infile,"%s",word) \= EOF) && (bytesdone < nbytes)) 
if ((wordcode = decode_word(word)J != BADWORD) { 
} 
} 
if (LFSRGetBit()) { 
wordcode A= LFSRval; 
shiftreg I= (wordcode & INandmask); 
cbits += wordbits; 
if (debug) 
fprintf {stderr, "%d: %d\ t%s\ t", wordnum, wordcode&INandrnask, word) ; 
if (cbits >= OUTBITS) { 
} 
outch = (shiftreg >> (cbits - OUTBITS)) & OUTandmask; 
shiftreg &= {(1 << (cbits - OUTBITSJ) - l); 
cbits -= OUTBITS; 
if (debug) 
fprintf(stderr, "char = %d %c", (int) outch, (char) outch); 
else 
putc(outch,stdout); 
if {outf) 
fputc(outch,outfile); 
bytesdone++; 
shiftreg = shiftreg << wordbits; 
if (debug) 
fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 
else if (debug) { 
fprintf (stderr, "%d; \ t%s -- dummy \n", wordnum, word) ; 
} 
wordnwn++; 
if ((feof(infile)) && {bytesdone < nbytes)J 
fprintf(stderr,"\nPremature end of input file!\n"); 
fclose{infile); 
if (outf) 
fclose{outfile); 
fflush(stdout); 
fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 
fprintf(stderr,•\n"); 
/***********************************************************************!
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AA BONZJFY.BAS 
A.4.1 A Few Words About PowerBasic
The PowerBasic language is not far removed from other procedural languages such as C, and it is 
often easier to use for certain programming tasks. We anticipate that readers familiar with C or 
Pascal will be able to make some sense of the BONZIFY.BAS source code, particularly if the 
following tips are noted: 
• In PowerBasic, the data type of a variable is usually given by the last character of its name
(the "extension" character). Variable types used in the bonzifier source code are shown
below.
name (no extension) single-precision floating-point number
name% 16-bit, signed integer
name$ character string of arbitrary length (as memory pennits)
name? 8-bit, unsigned byte
name?? 16-bit, unsigned integer
name??? 32-bit, unsigned integer
• If the data-type extension is the first character of the name, then the name represents a
global constant (e.g., %MaxThings = 256).
• All characters following a single quote on a line are considered a comment. e.g.,
y = SQR(-1) ' I should fix this later 
�.4.2 The Source Code for BONZIFY.BAS 
usage: 
BONZIFY [-i infile] [-1 langfile] [-o outfile] [ -b wordbits] [-p padding] 
[-s seed] [-debug] [-check thing] 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------' 
rlobal constants, directives: 
:stack 10000 
:ERROR Stack+, Bounds+, Numeric-, Overflow-
lefaultinfile$ = "INBONZO.TXT" 
lefaultlangfile$ = "POETRYl. L� 
lefaultoutfile$ = "BONZ01.B" 
lebugfile$ 
lebug% = 0 
= "BONZO.LOG" 
63 
- -- --- -- ----�---- - - --- - --- --
'-----------------------------------------------------------------------------·
Constants for Language generator: 
%Rand.Reps = -1 
%Thing = 0 
%Literal = 1 
%Punctuation = 2 
%Probfactor = 3 
%Unknown = 999 
%LineWrap = -1 
%0utFile = 1 
%OutConsole = 2 
%MAXI TS = 10 . how recursive we will let it be 
%MaxThings = 256 
%MaxRules = 5000 
%MaxinSize= 4092 . in bytes . we must have %MaxinSize *" wordbits% I 8 < 32K
·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------·
Constants for Encoder: ·-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
wordbits% = 5 
padding% = 0 
check% = 0 
xlen% = 0 
%LenBi ts = 12 
default; embed length in bonzotext 
num bits we devote to the length of bonzotext payload 
screen O 
color 9,0 
on error goto ErrorHandler 
randomize timer 
call GetCommandLineArgs(infile$,langfile$,outfile$} 
::all LoadinFile 
call GenCodePos 
'1ordmask% = (2 ' wordbits%) - 1
:ype node 
lpoint as byte 
tipe as byte 
nval as byte 
st as byte 
nchars as byte 
ind type 
!im Lpoint% ( %MaxThings) , Lnopts% ( %MaxThings} , Ls how% ( %MaxThings)
iim Lonetime%(%MaxThings),Lvar$(%MaxThings),Lthing$(%MaxThings)
!im Rule$(%MaxRules),Rused%(%MaxRules) , Rnodest%(%MaxRules) ,Rnnodes%(%MaxRules) 
lim Rprobfactor% (%MaxRules)
lim huge rnode(22000) as node
Lim thingstack$ (%MAXITS)
:or i% = 0 to %MaxThings-1 
Lvar$ (i%) = "" 
,ext i% 
or i% = 0 to %MAXITS-l 
thingstack$(i%) = ""
.ext i% 
all LearnLang 
"Lnthings:";Lnthings%,ftNrules:";nrules%; 
rigtirne = timer 
all ProcessLang 
,"Nrnodes:";nrnodes% 
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open outfile$ for output as #3 
if debug% then open debugfile$ for output as #2 
if check% then call CheckThing 
StartofSentence% = -1 
wordnurn% = inbufstart% 
call FindThing( "Prelude", i%, er%) 
call MakeThing(i%,0,0,fail%,Opl$) 
call FindThing("Body",i%,er%) 
call MakeThing(i%,-1,0,fail%,Op2$) 
call FindThing( "Ending" ,i%, er%) 
call MakeThing(i%,0,0,fail%,Op3$) 
StartOfSentence% = -1 
call LWPrint(Op1$,0,%0utFile) 
call LWPrint(Op2$,l,%0utFile) 
call LWPrint(Op3$,0,%0utFile) 
? "Words in bonzoblock:";wordnum% 
? "Total Errors:";Tota1Errs% 
tm = timer - origtime 
tmin% = tm \ 60 
tsec% = tm - tmin%*60 
' don't encode, not desperate 
' not desperate (initially) 
' don't encode, not desperate 
tsec$ = str$(tsec%) tsec$ = right$(tsec$,len(ts'ec$J-1) 
if len(tsec$) = 1 then tsec$ = "0" + tsec$ 
? "Total Time: "; : print using "####"; tmin%; : ? ": "; tsec$; 
if xb% or xpad% or xseed% or xlen% theh 
? 
color 15 
end if 
? "The debonzifier will need to know the following: " 
if xb% 'then 
color 13,0 
color 14,0 
color 15,0 
end if 
if xpad% then 
color 13,0 
color 14,0 
color 15, 0 
end if 
if xseed% then 
color 13, 0 
color 14,0 
color 15, 0 
end if 
if xlen% then 
color 13, 0 
color 14,0 
color 15,0 
end if 
? " wordbits:"; 
? wordbits%; 
locate ,19 : ? "-b";wordbits% 
? " padding:"; 
? padding%; 
locate ,19 : ? "-p";padding% 
? " seed:"; 
? seed%; 
locate , 19 : ? "-s"; seed% 
? " length:"; 
? inbytes%; 
locate ,19 : ? "-xlen";inbytes% 
if debug% then close 2 
close 3 
end 
' must have END since there is ErrorHandler code later 
;ub ProcessLang 
shared Lpoint%{),Lnopts%(),Lthing$(),Lonetime%(),Lnthings%,Lshow%() 
shared Rule$(),Rnodest%(),Rnnodes%(),rnode(),nrnodes%,RProbfactor%() 
shared nrules% 
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'? : ? "Processing Language" 
color 11,0 
nrnodes% = 0 
for thing% = 0 to Lnthings%-1 
r% = Lpoint%(thing%) 
ting$ = Lthing$(thing%) 
for rn% = 0 to Lnopts%(thing%)-1 
call IncTimer 
rool$ = Rule$(r%) 
newrool$ = "" 
roolnodes% = 0 
cptr% = 1 
Rnodest%{r%) = nrnodes% 
while rool$ <> 
call GetToken(rool$,t$,tipe%) 
if tipe% = %thing then 
tl$ = t$ 
if left$(t$,1) = "#" then tl$ = r:ight$(t$,len(t$)-1) 
call FindThing(t1$,index%,er%) 
if er% then 
color 14,0 ? "thing:"; : color 15,0 ; ? ting$; 
color 14,0 ? rule:"; : color 15,0 : ? Rule$(r%) 
end 
end if 
if newrool$. < >  " "  then 
rnode{nrnodes%) .tipe 
rnode(nrnodes%) .lpoint 
rnode(nrnodes%) .st 
rnode(nrnodes%) .nchars 
newrool$ = newrool$ + " " 
= %thing 
incr cptr% 
incr nrnodes% 
incr roolnodes% 
= index% 
= cptr% 
= len{t$) 
newrool$ = newrool$ + t$ 
cptr% = cptr% + len(t$) 
elseif tipe% = %Punctuation then 
t$ = mid$(t$,2,len{t$)-2) get rid of quote marks 
if newrool$ <> " "  then newrool$ = newrool$ + " " : incr cptr% 
rnode(nrnodes%) .tipe = %Punctuation 
rnode(nrnodes%) .st = cptr% 
rnode(nrnodes%) .nchars = len(t$) 
incr nrnodes% 
incr roolnodes% 
newrool$ = newrool$ + t$ 
cptr% = cptr% + len(t$) 
elseif tipe% = %ProbFactor then 
Rprobfactor%(r%) = val(t$) 
elseif tipe% = %Literal then 
t$ = mid$(t$,2,len(t$)-2) ' get rid of quote marks 
if ting$="Prelude" or ting$=•Ending" then 
if newrool$ <> " "  then newrool$ = newrool$ + " " 
rnode{nrnodes%) .tipe = %Literal 
rnode(nrnodes%) .st = cptr% 
rnode(nrnodes%) .nchars = len{t$) 
incr nrnodes% 
incr roolnodes% 
newrool$ = newroo1$ + t$ 
cptr% = cptr% + len(t$) 
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incr cptr% 
else 
do 
if newrool$ <> "• then newrool$=newrool$ + " " incr cptr% 
call GetToken(t$,word$,er%) 
call EncodeWord(word$,w%) 
rnode(nrnodes%) .tipe 
rnode(nrnodes%).nval 
rnode(nrnodes%) .st 
rnode(nrnodes%) .nchars 
incr nrnodes% 
incr roolnodes% 
= 
= 
= 
= 
%Literal 
w• 
cptr% 
len (word$) 
newrool$ = newrool$ + word$ 
cptr% = cptr% + len(word$) 
loop until t$ = "• 
end if 
end if 
wend 
Rnnodes%(r%) = roolnodes% 
Rule$(r%) = newrool$ 
incr r% 
next rn% 
next thing% 
' now check the ConsoleEcho rule 
::all FindThing ( "ConsoleEcho", i%, er%) 
if er% then? "'ConsoleEcho' not defined, so nothing will be seen" 
r% = Lpoint% (i%) 
1odeptr% = Rnodest%(r%) 
Eor j% = O to Rnnodes%(r%)-1 
if rnode{nodeptr%) .tipe <> %thing then 
? "Error in definition of 'ConsoleEcho'" exit sub 
end if 
thingptr% = rnode(nodeptr%) .!point 
Lshow%(thingptr%) = -1 
incr nodeptr% 
text j% 
:olor 15, O 
ind sub 
cub LearnLang 
shared Lpoint%(),Lnopts%(),Lthing$(),Lonetime%(),Lnthings%,Rule$() 
shared langfile$,nrules% 
pen langfile$ for input as #2 
nthings% � 0, nrules% = 0, nopts% = 0, linecont% = 0 
color 9,0 : ? Loading language•; 
olor 13,0 
$ = "" 
bile not eof(2) 
line input #2, t$ 
origline$ = t$ 
call KilllnitSpace(t$) 
call Kil1Cornment(t$) 
call IncTimer 
if t$ <> " "  then 
Kil1EndSpace(t$) 
if right$(t$,l) = " " then 
-----
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exit sub 
a$= a$+ left$(t$,len{t$)-1) 
else 
a$ = a$ + t$ 
i% - instr(a$,"->") 
if i% > 0 then ' possibly new thing 
call GetToken(a$,t$,tipe%) 
call GetToken(a$,b$,tipe%J 
if b$ = "->" and t$ <> "" and a$<> "" then 
if Lnthings% > 0 then Lnopts%{Lnthings%-1) = nopts% 
nopts% = 1 
call CheckOneTime(t$,ot%) 
if ot% then Lonetime%{Lnthings%) = -1 
Lthing$(Lnthings%) = t$ 
Lpoint%(Lnthings%) = nrules% 
m% = instr(a$,"I") 
while m% > 0 
q$ = left$(a$,m%-1) 
Rule$(nrules%) = q$ 
a$= right$(a$,len(a$)-m%) 
incr nopts% 
incr nrules% 
m% = instr(a$,"["l 
wend 
Rule$(nrules%) = a$ 
incr Lnthings% 
incr nrules% 
else 
color 14,0 
color 15,0 
color 14,0 
? "Input format error: "; 
? origline$ 
? "Line Ignored" 
end if 
elseif Lnthings% = 0 then ' first line not a definition
color 14,0 ; ? "Error: first line should be a Thing definition" 
end 
else 
m% = instr(a$,")") 
while m% > 0 
q$ = left$(a$,m%-1) 
Rule$(nrules%) = g$ 
Rule$(nrules%) = left$(a$,m%-1) 
a$= right$(a$,len(a$)-m%) 
incr nopts% 
incr nrules% 
m% = instr(a$, "l"l 
wend 
Rule$(nrules%) = a$ 
incr nopts% 
incr nrules% 
end if 
a$ : H n 
end if 
end, if 
wend 
Lnopts% {Lnth,ings%-l) = nopts% 
:::lose 2 
'? : color 14,0 : ? string$(70,"-") 
::olor 15, 0
end sub 
sub MakeThing(tm%,encode%,desperate%,fails%,pout$J 
shared Lpoint%() ,Lnopts%() ,Lshow%{) ,Rule${),Rused%(),level%,debug% 
shared Lthing$(),Lonetime%(),Lvar${),Lnthings%,inpos%,inlen%,inbuf%() 
shared wordnum%,Rnodest%() ,Rnnodes%() ,RProbFactor%(),rnode{),TotalErrs% 
shared thingstack$(),wordmask% 
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local r$,t$,Op$,new0p$,i%,k%,nreps%,failed%,tomake$,tfails%,t1%,t2% 
local rulesleft%,rtried%(),nfailures%{),rpf%(),minfails%,rulenum%,failed% 
local oldinpos%,rnodeptr%() ,rout$(),rleft$(),rinpos%() 
local rrep%,rnptr%,tipe%,rnodeend%(),rnend% 
tomake$ = Lthing$(t�%) 
i% = tm% 
'thingstack$(level%) = tomake$ 
'for k% = 0 to level%-l 
if thingstack$(k%) = tomake$ then 
? ffWhoah! Recursive definition in language; •; 
color 15,0 ; ? tomake$; ; ?
if debug% then print #2, "Recursive definition; ";tomake$ 
fails%= 999 
pout$ = "" 
exit sub 
end if 
'next k% 
incr level% 
if debug% then Print #2, space$(level%);level%;":";tomake$ 
if level% = %MAXITS then 
fails%= 999 
pout$ = "" 
deer level% 
exit sub 
if debug% then print #2, "Too recursive for me!!!" 
end if 
nreps% = 1 
' if level% = 1 then call ClearOneTimers 
rulesleft% = Lnopts%(i%) 
jim rtried%(rulesleft%),nfailures%(rulesleft%),rout$(rulesleft%) 
dim rpf%(rulesleft%),rnodeptr%(rulesleft%),rnodeend%(rulesleft%) 
jim rinpos%(rulesleft%),rwordnum%(rulesleft%) 
k% = Lpoint%(i%) 
for j% = 0 to rulesleft%-1 
rout$(j%) = nn 
rnodeptr%(j%) = Rnodest%(k%) 
rnodeend%(j%) = rnodeptr%(j%) + Rnnodes%(k%) 
rinpos% {j'%) = inpos% 
rwordnum%{j%) = wordnum% 
rpf%(j%) RProbFactor%(k%) 
nfailures%(j%) = 0 
incr k% 
1ext j % 
1ewrule% = -1 
ione% = 0 
;fails% = 0 
,hile not done% 
call IncTimer 
k$ = inkey$ 
if k$ = chr$(27) then close #3 : end 
if k$ = "d w then debug% = l - debug% : ? "debug: • ; debug% 
if newrule% then 
call GetRuleNum(rtried%(),nfailures%(),rpf%(),rulesleft%,rulenum%) 
if encode% then 
rtried%(rulenum%J = -1 
wordnum% = rwordnum%(rulenum%) 
inpos% = rinpos%(rulenum%) 
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Op$= rout$(rulenum%) 
end if 
rnptr% = rnodeptr%(rulenum%) 
mend% = rnodeend%{rulenum%) 
r$ = Rule${Lpoint%{i%) + rulenum%) 
newrule% = 0 
if debug% then Print #2, space$(level%);level%;" rule :";r$ 
end if 
failed% = 0 ' applies to current node only; rule tally kept in nfailures%{) 
consider the next token in the rule 
t$ = mid$(r$,rnode(rnptr%}.st,rnode{rnptr%) .nchars) 
tipe% = rnode(rnptr%) .tipe 
if tipe% = %thing and left$(t$,l) = •# n then 
if inpos% < inlen% then rrep% = -1 
else 
rrep% = 0 
end if 
if tipe% = %Punctuation then 
:pew0p$ = t$ 
elseif tipe% = %Literal then 
new0p$ = t$ 
if encode% and (inpos% < inlen%) then 
if wordnum% < 0 then ' preamble use b=3 
t1% = inbuf%(wordnum%) 
incr wordnum% 
t2% = rnode(rnptr%) .nval AND 7 
if t1% �> t2% then incr failed% 
else 
call CheckForEncode(wordnum%,e%,cv%) 
incr wordnum% 
if e% then 
t1% = inbuf%(inpos%) 
incr inpos% 
t2% = (rnode(rnptr%) .nval XOR cv%) AND wordmask% 
if t1% <> t2% then incr failed% 
end if 
end if 
end if 
elseif tipe% = %thing then 
k% = rnode{rnptr%) .lpoint 
call MakeThing(k%,encode%,0,failed%,newOp$) 
end if 
call OutputAppend(Op$,newOp$) 
incr rnptr% 
if encode% then 
nfailures%(rulenum%)=nfailures%{rulenum%) + failed% 
rnodeptr%(rulenum%) = rnptr% 
rinpos%(rulenum%) = inpos% 
rwordnum%{rulenum%) = wordnum% 
rout$(rulenum%) = Op$ 
rfails% = nfailures%(rulenum%) 
minfails% = 32700 
for j% = 0 to rulesleft%-1 
if nfailures%(j%)<minfails% then minfails%=nfailures%(j%} 
next j% 
if rnptr% = mend% and rfails% <= minfails% then 
done% = -1 ' current rule is done and as good as the rest 
70 
elseif rnptr% = rnend% or rfails% > mlnfails% then 
newrule% = -1 ' a better rule exists
j% = 0 
while not done% and j% < rulesleft% 
if nfailures%(j%J=minfails% and rnodeptr%(j%)=rnodeend%(j%) then 
done% = -1 
Op$ = rout$ (j%) 
rfails% = minfails% 
inpos% = rinpos%(j%) 
wordnum% = rwordnum% {j-%) 
end if 
incr j-% 
wend 
end if
if done% then 
tfails% = tfails% + rfails% 
if Lthing$(i%J = "Body" then Tota1Errs% = tfails% 
if debug% then 
Print #2, space$(level%);level%;" prog out: ";Op$; 
Print #2," Errors: ";tfails% 
end if 
if rrep% and inpos% < inlen% then 
deer rnptr% 
nfailures%(rulenum%) = 0 
done% = 0 
end if 
end if 
else ' NO ENCODE 
if rnptr% = rnend% then done% = -1 
end if 
�end 
Lf Lshow% (i%) then call LWPrint (Op$, encode%, %0utConsole) 
�rase rtried%,nfailures%,rout$,rnodeptr%,rnodeend%,rinpos% 
' check for a one-time variable assignment here 
:ails% = tfails% 
)out$ = Op$ 
leer level% 
ind sub 
:ub FindThing{tomake$,i%,er%) 
shared Lthing$() ,Ln.things% 
1r% = 0 
.% = 0 
•bile (Lthing$ (i%) <> tomake$) and i% < Lnthings%
incr i% 
•end
then 
? tomake$; 
f i-% = Lnthings%
color 13, 0 ?
color 14,0 ; ? 
er% = -1 
" not defined in Language" 
nd if 
nd sub 
ub GetToken{cc$,tt$,tipe%) 
local c$, t$ 
all KillinitSpa'ce (cc$) 
71 
c$ = cc$ 
t$ = • " 
if c$ <> "" then 
' check for punctuation/formatting only!!! 
if left$(c$,1) = chr$(34) then ' the double quote
i% = instr(right$(c$,len(c$)-1),chr$(34)) 
if i% = 0 then tipe% =%Unknown : exit sub 
if i% = 1 then ' two quotes in a row = 
t$ = string${3,chr$(34)) 
else 
t$ = left$(c$,i%+1) 
end if 
c$ = right$(c$,len(c$)-i%-1) 
tipe% = %Literal 
punc% = -1 
i% : 2 
while punc% and i% < len{t$) 
if i% <= len(t$)-2 then 
x$ = mid$(t$,i%,2) 
if ucase$ (x$) : �\N" then 
i% = i% + 2
else 
x% = asc(mid$(t$,i%,1J) - 65 
if (x%>=0 AND x%<26) OR (x%>31 AND x%<58) then punc%=0 
incr i% 
end if 
else 
x% = asc(mid$(t$,i%,l)) - 65 
if (x%>=0 AND x%<26) OR (x%>31 AND x%<58) then punc%=0 
incr i% 
end if 
wend 
if punc% then tipe% = %Punctuation 
elseif left${c$,1) = "<" then 
c$ = right$(c$,len(c$)-1) 
call GetToken{c$,t$,t%J 
tipe% = %RandReps 
elseif left$(c$,l) = "[" then 
c$ = right${c$,len(c$)-l) 
i% : instr(c$, "] ") 
if i% = 0 then tipe% = %Unknown 
t$ = left$(c$,i%-1) 
c$ = right$(c$,len(c$)-i%) 
tipe% = %ProbFactor 
else 
i% : instr(c$," ") 
t% = instr(c$,chr$(9)) 
' random reps 
' probability factor 
cc$ = "" tt$ = ""
if t% > 0 and (i% = 0 or t% < i%) then i% = t% 
if i% > O then 
t$ = left$(c$,i%-l) 
c$ = right${c$,len(c$)-i%) 
else 
t$ c$ 
c$ = "" 
end i.f 
tipe% = %Thing 
end if 
1d if 
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exit sub 
·----- · ---------------------
call KillinitSpace(cS) 
call KillinitSpace(t$) 
cc$ = c$ 
tt$ = t$ 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub KillinitSpace(a$)
while a$<> "" and ((left$(a$,l) = " ") or (left$(a$,l) = chr$(9)))
a$= right$(a$,len(a$)-1) 
wend 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub KillEndSpace(a$)
..-bile a$<> •• and ((right$(a$,1) = " ") or (right$(a$,l} = chr$(9)))
a$= left$(a$,len(a$)-l) 
..-end 
end sub 
sub KillConunent (a$) 
:.% ""instr{a$,"//") 
.£ i% > 0 then a$= left$(a$,i%-1) 
md sub 
:ub usage 
•usage:•
"bonzify [-i infile] [-1 langfile] [-o outfile] [-b wordbitsJ" 
[-p padding] [-s seed] [-check thing] [-debug]" 
nd sub ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ub GetCommand.LineArgs(infile$,langfile$,outfile$J 
shared defaultinfile$,defaultlangfile$,defaultoutfile$,debug%,wordbits% 
shared padding%,seed%,check%,xlen%,xb%,xpad%,xseed%,tocheck$ 
im dynamic args${16) 
;i.rgs% = 0 
$ = conunand$ 
Lnfile$ = defaultinfile$ 
Langfile$ = defaultlangfile$ 
,utfileS = • • 
rile c$ <> • • 
call GetToken(c$,args$(nargs%),tipe%) 
if args$(nargs%) <> "" then incr nargs% 
md 
r = 0 
dle i% < nargs% 
args$(i%) = lcase$(args${i%)) 
if args$ (i%) = "-b" then 
incr i% 
wordbits% = vallargs$(i%)) 
if wordbits% < l or wordbits% > 8 then usage end 
elseif args$(i%) = "-p• then 
incr i% 
padding%= val(args${i%)) 
if padding% < 0 or padding% > 8 then usage end 
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elseif args${i%) = "-s" then 
incr i% 
seed%= val(args$(i%J) 
elseif args$(i%) = "-debug• then 
debug% = 1 
elseif args${i%) = "-check" then 
incr i% 
tocheck$ = args$(i%) 
check% = -1 
elseif args$(i%) = "-i" then 
incr i% 
cinfile$ = args${i%) 
elseif args$ {i%) = "-1" then 
incr i% 
clangfile$ = args$(i%) 
elseif args$ (i%J = "-xP then 
xlen% = -1 
elseif args$ (i%) = "-xb" then 
xb% = -1 
elseif args$(i%) = "-xp" then 
xpad% = -1 
elseif args${i%) = "-xs" then 
xseed% = -1 
elseif args$(i%) = "-o" then 
incr i% 
coutfile$ = args${i%) 
end if 
incr i% 
w=d 
' try to open input file 
exists% = 0 
while not exists% 
call FileExists(cinfile$,exists%) 
if exists% then 
infile$ = cinfile$ 
else 
color 13, O : ? "Input file: "; cinfile$; " not found." 
call getparrn("Input file name ["+defaultinfile$+"]",cinfile$) 
if cinfile$ = "" then cinfile$ = defaultinfile$ 
end if 
"end 
'color 14,0
'color 15,0
? "Infile: "; 
'? infile$ 
' try to open language file 
axists% = 0 
�hile not exists% 
call FileExists{clangfile$,exists%) 
if exists% then 
langfile$ = clangfile$ 
else 
color 13 1 0 : ? •Language file; ";clangfile$;" not found." 
call getparm ( "Language file name [ "+defaultlangfile$+"] ", clangfile$) 
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if clangfile$ = 
end if 
then clangfile$ = defaultlangfile$ 
wend 
'color 14,0 
'color 15,0 
? "Language file: "; 
? langfile$ 
if coutfile$ = "� then 
call getparm("Output file name ["+defaultoutfile$+"]",outfile$) 
if outfile$ = "" then outfile$ = defaultoutfile$ 
else 
outfile$ = coutfile$ 
end if 
erase args$ 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub FileExists{filename$,exists%)
shared filenotfound% 
filenotfound% = 0 
open filename$ for input as #5 
if filenotfound% then 
exists% = 0 
filenotfound-% = 0 
else 
exists% = -1 
close 5 
end if 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub getparm{q$,a$) 
color 11 
?q$; "? "; 
color 15
input "",a$ 
color 14 
end sub ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub CheckOneTime(t$,ot%) 
ot-% = 0 
i% = instr(t$, "*")
if i% > O then 
t$ = left$(t$,i%-1) 
ot% = -1 
:!nd if 
:!nd sub ·------------------------------------------------------------------------
;ub CheckforPunctuation(t$,isap%)
static firsttime%,p$(),np% 
Lf firsttime% = 0 then 
firsttime% = -1 
np% = 10
dim p$ (np%) 
p$(0) = : p$(1) ";" 
p$(5) = "?" : p${6) = " ' "
p${9) = chr$(13} 
md if 
.sap% = 0 
.$ = left$(t$,1) 
'.or i% = O to np%-1 
p$(2) = -.� : p$(3) = "!" : p$(4) = ":"
p$ (7) = chr$ {34) : p$ (8) = "-"
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if 1$ = p$(i%) then isap% = -1 
next i% 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub IncTimer
static t%,tcptr%, firsttime%,tchar$(),lasttime 
shared inpos%,inlen%,cirigtime,debug%,Tota1Errs% 
if firsttime% = 0 then 
firsttime% = 1 
dim tchars$ (8) 
tchar$ (0) = "I" 
tchar${3) = "\"
tchar$(6) = "-"
tcptr% = 0 
t% = 0 
lasttime = -1 
end if 
1'% = Csr1in 
K% = Pos (0) 
if t% MOD 17 : 0 then 
locate 1,78 
? tchar${tcptr%); 
incr tcptr% 
tchar$(1) 
tchar$(4) 
tchar$(7) 
= 
= 
= 
if tcptr% = 8 then tcptr% = 0 
md if 
"/" " I "
"\" 
i.f inpos% > 0 and t% MOD 20 = 0 then 
locate 1,62 ? space${18); 
locate 2,62 ? space$(18); 
locate 1,66 ? inpos%;"of";inlen%; 
locate 2, 62 ? "Errs:"; Tota1Errs%; 
t% = 0 
tm = timer - origtime 
if trn <> lasttime then 
tmin% = tm \ 60 
tsec% = tm - tmin%*60 
tchar$(2) : "-" 
tchar$(5) = "/"
tsec$ = str$(tsec%) : tsec$ = right$(tsec$,len{tsec$)-1) 
if len{tsec$) = 1 then tsec$ = "0" + tsec$ 
locate 2,74 : print using "#-#-##"; tmin%; : ? ":";tsec$; 
end if 
lasttime = tm 
ind if 
.ncr t% 
.ocate y%,x% 
,nd sub 
ub LWprint(Op$,changecolor%,dst%) 
shared outfile$,inpos%,StartOfSentence% 
olor 15,0 
p$ = Op$ 
% = instr(tp$, "\n") 
hile i% > 0 
tp$ = left${tp$,i%-l)+chr${13)+chr$(10)+right$(tp$,len{tp$)-i%-1) 
i% = instr{tp$,"\n") 
end 
% = 1 
tp$ : tp$ 
p$ = " -
or i\ = 1 to len(otp$) 
c$ = mid$(otp$,i%,1) 
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if c$ = " . "  or c$ = "J " or c$ = ''?" or c$ = ":" then 
StartOfSentence% = -1 
tp$ = tp$ + c$ 
elseif StartOfSentence% and (asc(c$) < 123 and asc{c$) > 64) then 
Start0£Sentence% = 0
tp$ = tp$ + ucase$(c$) 
else 
tp$ = tp$ + c$ 
end if 
1ext i% 
1hile (instr(tp$,chr${13)) > OJ OR (%LineWrap and (len(tp$) > 78)) 
iip% = instr(tp$,chr$(13)) 
if iip% > 0 and iip% <= 78 then 
if dst% = %OutFile then 
print #3, left$(tp$,iip%-l) 
else 
call cprint(changecolor%,left$(tp$,iip%-1)) 
? 
end if 
tp$ = right$(tp$,len(tp$)-iip%-1) 
else 
h% = 78_ 
while h% >land mid$(tp$,h%,1) <> " " 
deer h% 
wend 
if dst% = %OutFile then 
print #3, left$(tp$,h%) 
else 
call cprint{changecolor%,left${tp$,h%)) 
? 
end if 
tp$ = right${tp$,len(tp$)-h%) 
end if 
a:nd 
E dst% = %outfile then 
print #3, tp$; 
lse 
call cprint(changecolor%,tp$) 
1d if
id sub 
1b cprint{e%,t$) 
static lwordnum%,firsttime% 
shared inbufstart% 
firsttirne% = 0 then 
lwordnurn% = inbufstart% 
firsttime% = 1 
.d if 
e% = 0 then 
color 15,0
? t$; 
exit sub 
d if 
ile len(t$) > 0
t% = 1 
while mid$(t$,t%,1) = chr$(32) or rnid$(t$,t%,1) = chr$(9) and t%<len(t$) 
incr t% 
wend 
if t% = len(t$) then exit sub just spaces & tabs -- nothing to print 
while mid$(t$,t%,l)<>chr${32) and mid$(t$,t%,l)<>chr$(9) and t%<len(t$) 
incr t% 
wend 
w$ = left$(t$,t%) 
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if t% < len(t$) then 
t$ = right$(t$,len(t$)-t%) 
else 
t$ = ".
end if 
color 15,0 
punct% = -1 
for i% = 1 to len(w$J 
r$ = rnid$(w$,i%,l) 
r% = asc(r$)-65 
if (r% >= 0 and r% < 26) or (r% >= 32 and r% < 58) then punct% = 0 
next i% 
if not punct% then 
if lwordnum% < 0 then 
color 14,0 
else 
call CheckForEncode(lwordnum%,c%,cv%) 
if c% then color 14,0 
end if 
incr lwordnum% 
end if 
? w$; 
wend 
end sub ·---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ErrorHandler: 
filenotfound%=0 
if err=53 then filenotfound% = 1 : resume next 
s$=�program error "+str$(err)+" at "+str$(eradr) 
:olor 15,0 
? s$ 
�nd 
;ub EncodeWord(word$,c%) 
shared wordm:ask% 
:% = 0 
:"irstchar% = -1 
:or i% = 1 to len(word$) 
r$ = mid$(word$,i%,l) 
if firstchar% then r$ = ucase$(r$) 
r% = asc (r$) -65 
if (r% >= 0 and r% < 26) or (r% >= 32 and r% < 58) then 
firstchar% = 0 
c% = c% + r% 
end if 
1ext i% 
can't do "c% = c% AND wordrnask%" cuz preamble may have h:3 
·% = c% AND 255
nd sub
uh LoadinFile
shared infile$,inbuf%(),inpos%,inlen%,inbytes%,inbufstart% 
shared wordbits%,debug%,xlen%,xb%,xpad%,xseed%,padding%,seed% 
im inbuf%(-3 TO %MaxlnSize * 8 I wordbits% + 1) 
nbufstart%: 0 
format of full preamble: -3 -2 -1 0
78 
b p
all preamble fields are optional 
if xseed%=0 then 
if xpad% =0 then 
if xb% =0 then 
' zero inbuf 
'color 9, O ; ? 
inbytes% = 0 
if :tlen% then 
deer inbufstart% 
deer inbufstart% 
deer inbufstart% 
Loading Infile"; 
inlen% = 0 : chits%= 0 
shiftreg-% = 0 
else 
s start of body 
inbuf%(inbufstart%) = seed% 
inbuf%(inbufstart%) = padding% 
inbuf%{inbufstart%) = wordbits% 
inlen% = %LenBits \ wordbits% 
shiftreg% = 0 
cbits% = %LenBits MOD wordbits% 
end if 
open infile$ for binary as #1 
while not eof{ll 
get$ 1,1,1$ 
linepos% = 1 
while linepos% <= len(l$) 
incr inbytes% 
x% = asc(mid$(1$,linepos%,1)) 
shiftreg% = shiftreg% OR x% 
chits%= chits%+ 8 
while chits% >= wordbits% 
inbuf%(inlen%) = shiftreg% \ 2 A (cbits%-wordbits%) 
incr inlen% 
shiftreg% = shiftreg% AND {2�(cbits%-wordbits%) - 1) 
cbits% = cbits% - wordbits% 
wend 
shift:reg% : shiftreg% * 2"8 
incr linepos% 
wend 
rend 
bits% = cbits% 
'hile lbits% > 0 
cbits% = chits%+ 8 ' as if new value were loaded in
while {chits%>= wordbits%) and (lbits% > 0) 
inbuf%{inlen%) = shiftreg% \ 2A (cbits%-wordbits%) 
incr inlen% 
shiftreg% = shiftreg% AND (2 A{cbits%-wordbits%) - 1) 
cbits%: chits% - wo:rdbits% 
lbits% = lbits% - wordbits% 
wend 
shiftreg% = shiftreg% * 2"8 
end 
load in dummy val 
lose 1 
f xlen% = 0 then 
wo:rdmask& = 2"wordbits% - 1 
nb?? = inbytes% 
if (%LenBits MOD wordbits%) <> D 
nb?? = nb?? * 2 "  {wordbits% 
end if 
then 
- (%LenBits MOD wordbits%))
for i% = CEIL(csng(%LenBits) I csng{wordbits%))-1 to O step -1 
inbuf%{i%) = inbuf%(i%) OR (nb?? AND wordmask&J 
nb?? = nb?? \ 2"wordbits% 
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next i% 
end if 
if debug% then 
open "test.dat" for output as -#1 
print #1, "inlen = "; inlen%, "nbytes "" "; inbytes% 
print #1, "wordbits = • ;wordbit%, •padding= • ;padding%, "seed = ff ;seed% 
print #1,"" 
for i% = inbufstart% to inlen%-1 
b$ = bin$(inbuf%(i%)} 
while len(b$) < wordbits% 
b$ = "0" + b$ 
wend 
print #1, i%,inbuf%{i%),b$ 
next i% 
close 1
end if 
inpos% = 0 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub ClearOneTimers 
shared Lvar$(J ,Lnthings% 
for k% = 0 to Lnthings%-1 
Lvar$ {k%) =
next k% 
end sub 
' clear the one-timers 
·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub InsertTypos(tomake$,c%,t%) 
' to be implemented in the future 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub GetRuleNum(rtried%(1) ,nfailures%(1) ,rprobfactors%il) ,nr%,rulenum%) 
static first time%, pd£% () 
%MaxNrules = 1000 
if firstti.me% = 0 then 
firsttirne% = -1 
dim pdf%(%MaxNrules) 
:!nd if 
if nr% > %MaxNrules then beep ? • increase MaxNrules ! "
ninfails% = 32000 
:ulesleft% = 0 
�% = 0 
Eor i% = 0 to nr%-1 
if rtried%(i%) then 
pd£% (i%) = -1
else 
if rprobfactors%(i%)= 0 then 
s% = s% + 1
else 
s% = s% + rpl:'obfactors%[i%) 
end if 
pdf% (i%) = s% 
incr rulesleft% 
end if 
if nfailures%(i%) < minfails% then 
minrule% = i% 
minfails% = nfailures%(i%) 
end if 
1ext i% 
.f rulesleft% = 0 then ' pick min so far 
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delay 1 end 
rulenum% = minrule% 
else 
d = rnd * CSNG(s%) 
d% = fix(d) 
rulenum% = D 
while pdf%(rulenum%) <= d% and rulenum% < nr%-l 
incr rulenum% 
wend 
end if 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub OutputAppend{Op$,neWOp$)
if Op$= ft" then 
Op$ = new0p$ 
elseif right$(Op$,1) = chr$(10} or right$(Op$,2) = "\n" then 
Op$= Op$+ neWOp$ 
else 
call CheckforPunctuation{left$(newOp$,l),isap%) 
i£ isap% or right${0p$,l) = chr$(34) then 
Op$= Op$+ new0p$ 
else 
Op$ = Op$ + a '' + new0p$ 
end i.f
end if 
and sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub CheckThing 
shared Lpoint%(),Lnopts%{),Lshow%(),Rule$(),Rused%(),level%,debug% 
shared Lthing$(),Lonetime%{),Lvar${),Lnthings%,inpos%,inlen%,inbuf%() 
shared Rnodest%{J,Rnnodes%(),rnode() ,Tota1Errs%,tocheck$,wordbits% 
Hm found% (256) 
:all FindThing(tocheck$,i%,er%) 
Lf er% then end 
:irules% = Lnopts%(i%) 
,uleptr% = Lpoint%(i%) 
1 ; ? "Thing: a ; tocheck$ 
? �nrules: ";nrules% 
:or j% = 0 to Lnopts%(i%)-l 
nodeptr% = Rnodest%(ruleptr%) 
if rnode{nodeptr%) .tipe = %Literal then 
a$= mid${Rule$(ruleptr%),rnode(nodeptr).st, rnode(nodeptr) .nchars) 
v% = rnode(nodeptr%J .nval 
incr found%(v%) 
v$ = str$ (v%) 
if v% < 10 then 
v$ = ao• + right$(v$,l) 
else 
v$ = right${v$,len(v$)-1) 
end if 
? v$,a$ 
print #3, v$,a$ 
end if 
incr ruleptr% 
text j% 
I ft9999 Missing: •; 
1rint -#3, ft999.9 Missing: "; 
:or i% = 0 to 2 Awordbits%-1 
if found%(i%)=0 then ? i%; : print#3,i%; 
:ext i% 
•rint #3,"'a
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close 3 
end 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub GenCodePos 
shared padding%,seed%,inlen%,codepos%() ,codeval%(),debug%,LFSRval?? 
dim codepos%(inlen%) ,codeva1%(inlen%) 
call InitLFSR{padding%,seed%J 
wordnurn% = -1 
for i% = 0 to inlen%-1 
b% = 0 
while b% = 0 
call LFSRGetBit{b%) 
incr wordnum% 
wend 
codepos%(i%) wordnum% 
codeval%(i%) = LFSRval?? 
next i% 
if debug% then 
? "ncodes = "; inlen% 
? "nwords = ";wordnurn%+1 ' 
for i% = 0 to inlen%-1 
? codepos%(i%);": •;codeval%(i%);" "; 
next i% ' 
end if 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub InitLFSR(p%,s%) 
shared LFSRval??,LFSRtab%() 
p% is padding 
s% is seed 
make the table mapping 8-bit uniform rv's to a binary rv with probability 
of outputing a O given by p% I 8 (for p% = 0 to 7) 
dim LFSRtab% { 8) 
for i% = 0 to 7 
LFSRtab%(i%) = 1 
next i% 
if p% > 8 then p% = 8 ' signifies "no encoding" mode 
for i% = 0 to p%-1 
LFSRtab%{i%) = 0 
next i% 
' put initial value in shift register -- use seed, if supplied 
LFSRval?? = &bl001011100110100 
ifs% > D ands% <> LFSRval?? then LFSRval?? = LFSRval?? XOR s% 
end sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub GetBit(n??,b%,o%) 
:>% = D 
lf (n?? AND (2 Ab%)J <> 0 then 0% = 1 
�nd sub ·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
;ub LFSRGetVal (0%) 
82 
shared LFSRval?? 
for i% = 1 to 3 
' new input to LFSR = bl4 XOR b3 XOR b9 
call GetBit(LFSRval??,14,b1%) 
call GetBit(LFSRval??,3,b2%) 
call GetBit(LFSRval??,9,b3%) 
0% = (bl% XOR b2%) XOR b3% 
t& = ((LFSRval?? * 2) AND 65535) + 0%
LFSRval ?? = t& 
next i% 
0% = LFSRval?? AND 7 
end sub '--------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub LFSRGetBit(o%) 
shared LFSRval??,LFSRtab%() 
call LFSRGetVal(v%} 
0% = LFSRtab%(v%) 
' get 3-bit random value 
end sub --------------------------------------------------------------------------
sub CheckForEncode(i%,e%,cv%) 
shared codepos%(),codeval%(),inlen%,wordmask% 
static ptr% ' initialize ptr to O 
:3.one% = 0 
"'hile not done% 
if i% = codepos%(ptr%} then 
e% = -1 : done% = -1
cv% = codeval%(ptr%J AND wordmask% 
elseif i% < codepos%(ptr%J then 
if ptr% = 0 then 
e% = 0 done%= -1 
elseif i% > codepos%{ptr%-1) then 
e% = 0 : done% = -1 
else 
deer ptr% 
end if 
else ' i% > codepos%(ptr%) 
if ptr% = inlen%-1 then 
e% = 0 : done% = -1 
elseif i% < codepos%(ptr%+1J then 
e% = 0 : do�e% = -1 
else 
incr ptr% 
end if 
end if 
rend 
ind sub --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLELANGUAGEFILE 
The language file given below is used to generate bonzotext containing lists of names for grunge 
bands. It was used to produce the example bonzotext given !n Fig. 3.2. The format of language 
files used by the bonzifier is described in Section 3.5. 
II "GRUNGE.L" 
II used to generate list of {fictitious) grunge band names 
ConsoleEcho -> Prelude BandName Ending 
Prelude -> "Dear William: \n" 
I'm sorry I haven't written you 
"up with a name for my grunge band. 
sooner. I've been trying to come\n" _ 
Here are my best ideas so far: \n \n" 
Ending -> "\n Tell me if you have any favorites.\n" _ 
Adam \n \n" 
Body -> '#BandName 
BandName -> "• Name •" "\n" 
Name -> FrontMan "and the" PNoun 
FrontMan "&" PNP
SNPI PNP 
SNoun SNoun {2] SNP $Noun 
Adj 
TV-Adj PNP 
Number Adj PNoun 
[30] 
FrontMan -> PersonNarne I PersonNarne PersonNarne J l).dj PersonNarne 
PersonName SNoun 1 SNoun 
SNP -> SDet SNoun [3 J 
SDet Adj SNoun 
Adj SNoun 
SNoun 
?NP -> PDet PNoun [5] 
PDet Adj PNoun [3J 
PDet SNoun PNoun [2] 
SNoun PNoun [2] 
Adj PNoun 
Number PNoun 
PNoun 
II Singular Noun Phrase 
II Plural Noun Phrase 
'I Determiners to modify singular nouns 
iDet -> •'the" [20) 
I 
"a" [5) 
•another" "some" I •this" I "that"
· I Determiners to modify plural nouns 
'Det -> "the" !20] J "those" I "these" I "some" 
I Determiners indicating possession 
'OSDet -> "my• ) "your" ! "our" I "his" I "her'' I "thy" 
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Number -> "fourteen" 
"eight" 
"fifty-two" 
•four"
II Singular nouns 
SNoun -> •ghost"
•sociologist"
"mold"
"crust"
"funk�
"scum"
"spud"
•rubber"
"raisin"
"art"
"absorber"
"obsession"
"voodoo"
II Plural nouns 
PNoun -> "rabbits" 
"mushrooms" 
"flag-wavers" 
"punks" 
•bodies"
"angels"
"victims"
"cuff links"
"heads"
"enzymes"
"bears"
"beggars"
•breakfasts"
'ersonName -> "Kenny" 
"Lola" 
"Albert" 
"Mickey" 
"Alexis" 
"Robert" 
"Jimbo" 
"eighteen" 
"seventy-five" 
"forty-nine" 
"eleven" 
"weed" 
"king" 
"haircut" 
"bastard" 
"coroner" 
"patriarch" 
"puppy" 
"killer" 
"death" 
"replacement" 
"jalopy' 
"wax" 
''mascara" 
"brothers" 
"delegat,es" 
"dogs" 
"breasts" 
"thieves• 
"muscles" 
"boys" 
"clergymen" 
"devils" 
"probes" 
"coeds" 
"lovers" 
"shoes" 
I "Harry" 
"Herbert" 
"Bonnie" 
"Jonnie" 
"Judas" 
"Rosy" 
"Wolfgang" 
"sixty-nine" 
"nineteen" 
"twenty-six" 
"thirty-seven" 
"bellboy" 
"minstrel" 
"curd" 
"aerosol" 
"mistress" 
"critter" 
"ambush" 
"sludge" 
"vitriol" 
"cow" 
•judge"
"torture"
"fungus"
"eggs" 
"fish" 
"cramps" 
"grocers" 
"lizards" 
"censors" 
"eyelashes" 
"daughters" 
"fjords" 
"sisters" 
•torpedoes"
"stones"
"skeptics"
I "Eddy" 
"Sheldon• 
"Ginger" 
"Reginald" 
"Drake" 
"Troy" 
"Deborah" 
"eighty-one" 
"thirty-six" 
"two" 
"thirteen" 
"lover" 
"apocalypse" 
"wagon" 
"boogie" 
"cod" 
"slug" 
"madam" 
"muffin" 
"mud" 
"bus" 
"fuzz" 
"cadaver" 
•tonsil"
"monks" 
"dragons" 
"golfers" 
''carcasses" 
"journalists" 
"doctors" 
"flowers" 
"puppies" 
"musicians" 
"growths" 
"barbarians" 
"kings" 
"paperbacks" 
"Sara" 
"Bunny" 
"Eli" 
"Howard" 
"David" 
"James'' 
"Adam" 
I Adjectives which may also be used as transitive verbs 
'V-Adj -> "rolling" 
•talking"
"sleeping"
"burning"
"charming" 
"bleeding" 
"dreaming" 
"drowning" 
"smashing" 
"twirling" 
"flailing" 
"farting" 
"throwing" 
"crying" 
"smoking" 
"flaming" 
•puking"
"weeping"
"shaving"
"screaming"
I Adjectives beginning with Consonant {mostly describing characteristics) 
dj -> "amazing" 
"gooey" 
"turquoise" 
"psychic" 
"loud" 
"soft" 
"lazy' 
"tiny" 
"blind" 
"puny" 
"dry" 
•motley"
"neurotic" 
"petulant" 
"insipid" 
"deadly" 
"geriatric" 
"gentle" 
"rabid" 
"supersonic" 
"opaque" 
"radical" 
"lonely'' 
"drab" 
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"swell" 
"hypnotic" 
•godless"
"pink"
"big-boned"
"diseased•
"naked"
"pagan"
"large"
"dead"
"noxious"
"dang"
"hydrostatic" 
"low-calorie" 
"ravenous" 
"luscious" 
"angry" 
"foamy-necked" 
"dreadful" 
"high-velocity" 
"incredible" 
"felonious" 
"bald" 
"clumsy" 
APPENDIX C. SAMPLE OUTPUT 
Three examples of bonzotext produced by the implemented system described in Chapter 3 are 
given in this Appendix. They were each generated using different language files. 
C. l SAMPLE BONZOTEXT I: COMPLAINT LETTER
Dear Sir: 
I am writing to express my concerns about Ted Wilcox, and more specifically, 
his criticisms regarding scary weirdos. It is worth noting at the outset that 
essentially, he is nothing if not annoying. Nonetheless, Ted should just 
guit whining about everything. 
To start, his views are nothing short of nerdy. I imagine that nobody 
likes neurotic deadheads. You see, Ted is intentionally being diabolic. 
Let me cut to the chase: Anger is contagious. Let me mention again that 
the hate just keeps on coming. More prosaically, bloodthirsty imbeciles 
have no business here. 
It's my hunch that like hate-filled dipsomaniacs, he will certainly 
coordinate a revolution. To be honest, his use of counter-productive 
neanderthals is unquestionably pathetic. On a similar note, my 
observations are perhaps unique. Curiously, I'm indubitably afraid of 
savage vigilantes. As will become apparent within a short period of time, 
he is wrong. Please let me explain that his claims are pure tripe. 
To begin with, his theories are a pitiful jumble of incoherent nonsense. 
Generally speaking, I predict catastrophe. Although he is wrong, his 
tactics will regulate jingoism sometime soon. 
Certainly, it's shabby fiends like Ted that manipulate everything and 
everybody. Still, anger is contagious. Moreover, subhuman 
authoritarians have no business here. In other words, Ted masterminded 
last year's now-infamous attempt to turn vegetarians loose against us good 
citizens. 
I thank you for your attention and efforts in rectifying this situation. 
Sincerely, 
Adam D. Cain 
fhis sample bonzotext was generated using a language based on S. Pakin's "Automatic Complaint 
3enerator" [22]. The hidden message in the text above is "I think I need a burrito." It is 
mencrypted and was bonzified with � = 2, p = 3 and er= 2. 
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:::.2 SAMPLE BONZOTEXT 2: MODERN POETRY 
Dearest Emily, 
My feelings for you are impossible to express within the confines of 
conventional letter-writing form. And so I must turn to poetry ..... 
"Raging and weeping women seem meaningless" 
hold me ... sudden movement is risky 
give up thinking surely this too shall pass 
architects of doom only look dangerous without complaining 
you belong here -- why? We are lost! 
it appears impossible because simon says don't move 
some siblings who prefer the darkness smell good where the peacocks strut 
we share a secret smile: I feel partially hydrogenated! 
Repack your parachute and all the teachers block our path 
They often appear in your dreams 
everyone notices (really it does) 
you remember you cannot hide 
dealers without purpose deny everything while our wounds heal 
is there any truth? 
Beauty and truth can't be trusted 
write poems, despite the pain by starlight 
Am I SHOPLIFTING? 
Whenever nobody tells me anything, i like everything 
without speaking ... viruses among the young tumble like the autumn leaves 
speak to me -- don't look over your shoulder 
clouds block the moon because i am you 
by lamplight waiters surround you 
stop crying, but stop blaming me for everything 
you're safe now 
keep your shadow clean 
just keep on dancing (instead of leaving) 
poisoned chocolates never sleep 
nobody cares what happens 
next time you should have stayed in bad 
Well, I hope you understand now. 
Yours sincerely, 
Adam 
he hidden message in the bonzotext above is "Send help!" which was symmetrically encrypted 
sing PGP (with passphrase "password!") before bonzification with parameters J3;; 2, p;; 0. 
he ciphertext is 46 bytes in length and was not processed with Stealth. 
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C.3 SAMPLE BONZOTEXT 3: RECIPES 
Dear Adam, 
Here's a sampling of the recipes I've been developing. If any of 
them sound good let me know and I'll make it for dinner tonight. 
Broiled linguine squares pilaf 
1 guava, rinsed and drained 
4 2 I 3 gram pork 
1 pheasant 
1 jalapeno, dried 
5 gram linguine 
1 guava 
2/3 tablespoon basil 
6 3/4 jar mayonnaise 
Thaw ingredients. In a large saucepan, press frozen spinach, yogurt, catsup 
and chives until done. Add peppers. Form into patties. Grind some mustard 
seed, lima beans, broccoli and tofu until done. Fold in broth, stirring 
occasionally. Keep covered. Drain until tender. Yield: 10 Servings 
Hong Kong raisin cookies du jour 
(home-made apples give this a bit of bitterness) 
1 raisin, well-scrubbed 
1 2/3 quart catsup 
1 1/4 gram beef 
1 eggplant, dried 
2/3 tablespoon coriander 
1 ounce broccoli 
1 raisin, thinly sliced 
1/8 tablespoon pepper 
1 mango 
3 1/8 cup mayonnaise 
1 avocado, peeled 
1 1/4 quart water 
1 tomato, chopped 
1 apple, minced or pressed 
Grease one large baking pan. Whisk together all ingredients. Chill until 
it attains the desired consistency. Season with mustard seed to taste. 
Serve on a bed of lettuce. Yields 5 servings. 
Hope you like them. 
Joe 
"his sample bonzotext was generated using a language written by Joseph Futrelle The hidden 
1essage in the text above is "Pass the milk." It is unencrypted and was bonzified with J3 ;;;: 2, p;;;: 
, and cr = 5. 
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